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managed, contribute to financial crisis. Then, I find that an appreciating real exchange rate was a 
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Finally, large public deficits in combination with large external capital inflows led to the build-up 
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1. Introduction 
Financial crises have been a frequent recurring feature in the economic history of Argentina 
from the crisis of the 1820s in connection with the war against Brazil to the economic 
collapse in the first years of the 21
st
 century. The first half of this long period was a true 
success story for Argentina. Until World War I the Argentines experienced a strong export led 
growth, so that Argentina by then was one of the richest countries in the world with a living 
standard on level with USA. After that growth has stagnated and the living standard has sunk 
in relation to the world around. In 1985 it was only 30 % of that of USA (Dornbusch/de Pablo 
1987, p. 3). In the beginning of the 2000s came another fall. Even if Argentina’s long term 
economic stagnation cannot be entirely explained from financial crises, these have contributed 
to the decline. Moreover, crises can be moments in history when the fundamental problems 
appear clearer. To study the crises thus gives vital perspectives to Argentina’s long term 
stagnation.  
1.1. Aim and research question 
My purpose is to try to explain why the chosen crises occurred, that is to try to find causes to 
the crises. In doing so, I further want to compare the crises and seek to find similarities, 
differences and possible patterns concerning the causes of the crises.  In this analysis I will try 
to separate domestic and external causes.  
I will strive to describe the context of each crisis and cover several explanatory factors. The 
starting point for this is the notion that a crisis rarely can be explained by one, specific factor, 
but that it most often is a question of several factors working together. Consequently, I have 
chosen not to limit this investigation to some single aspect, which has made this account 
relatively comprehensive.  
1.2. Scope 
The investigation is limited to four financial crises: 1890-91, 1929-32, 1980-82 and 2001-
2002. My selection is based on wanting to examine crises of different periods covering most 
of Argentina’s economic history. Further, I have chosen crises that all had very serious 
economic consequences. The crisis of 1914 I decided leave out, partly because of limited time 
and partly because of its obvious connection with the outbreak of the First World War. 
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Concerning the crisis of 1989, its causes are largely rooted in the preceding crisis at the 
beginning of the 1980s, so I only incidentally mention the events in 1989.  
I have also limited my investigation to dealing with the causes of the crises leaving the 
discussion about the solutions and consequences aside.  
1.3. Outline of the essay 
First, after this introduction I will discuss some theoretical approaches and possible 
explanations for financial crises. Secondly, each crisis is presented (section 3). Here I will 
concentrate on a range of quantitative data in order to describe and understand how different 
aspects of the economy developed before and under the crises. Further, I will go into how the 
monetary regime worked, describe the development of the financial sector, and give accounts 
of the political development and the crisis management. Section 4 comprises the comparison, 
where I will discuss similarities, differences and possible recurring patterns in the Argentine 
economy. Finally, I will give my conclusions of this investigation.  
2. Theory, method and data 
A financial crisis is typically characterized by disturbances in financial markets, falling asset 
prices and insolvency among debitors and intermediaries, which spreads through the financial 
system and puts the system’s allocating function out of order. There are links between debt 
payment problems, bank failures and disturbances in the currency markets 
(Eichengreen/Portes 1987, p. 2). Only a number of banks going down, for instance, would not 
make a financial crisis in this sense.  
2.1. Previous research 
The academic discussion about causes for the chosen crises is extensive. I have built this 
essay around a vast body of research, and used some research to a greater extent for the 
descriptive accounts. For the 1890-91 crisis, Ford, Eichengreen (2003) and Miles are central; 
for the 1929-32 crisis, Taylor (1997), della Paolera/Taylor, Aldaheff and Maddison; for the 
1980-82 crisis, Dornbusch, Maddison and Sachs et al (1996); and for the 2001-02 crisis, della 
Paolera/Taylor (2003), Perry/Serven, Moreno and de la Torre et al. To my judgement, the 
sources used are reliable. In section 4.2 I will go into the varying views on the causes of each 
crisis based on some of the research.  
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In the literature, there are comparisons of different periods, for instance Maddison (1985), but 
to my knowledge no broad comparison of the four periods I cover here.  
2.2. Possible explanations of financial crises 
In the literature, there are several general explanations for the rise of financial crises. Below, I 
will in short give an account of some these, which are mostly based on experience from other 
historical crises and to some part include theoretical concepts. I will discuss them in my 
comparison of the causes of the four selected crises in Argentina.  
External shocks: First, there is the explanation that a crisis is caused by external factors, for 
example rising world interest rates, aggravated terms of trade or a world recession. In a fairly 
open economy, relatively small changes in such exogenous conditions can result in financial 
unrest, which can lead to costly liquidations of assets, unnecessarily large credit crunches and 
falls in economic activity (Chang/Velasco 1998, p. 3f). 
Sudden stop in the capital flow: Periods of powerful capital inflows may end rather suddenly, 
which can trigger a financial crisis. Edwards (1998) maintains that very large capital inflows 
are not sustainable in the long run. In the short term, international investors can overreact to 
positive investment opportunities. The expenses increase and the real exchange rate 
appreciates, which becomes a problem when the capital inflow weakens or suddenly stops. 
The real exchange rate will have appreciated too much and a strong adjustment must take 
place (Edwards 1998, p. 21ff). Capital flows to developing countries are characterized not 
only by cyclical patterns, but also by high volatility, which concerns mainly short-term capital 
in the form of portfolio investments and commercial loans. 
Deteriorating domestic savings: Gould asserts that the historic experiences show that foreign 
lending is most likely to be successful if it promotes and is followed by an increase in the 
domestic savings. This counteracts the threat of inflation, which can arise if foreign lending is 
channelled through the banking sector and there gives rise to an expansion of domestic 
credits. It also neutralizes the danger that foreign lending is used for import consumption and 
government expenses. If the savings on the other hand fall and credits on a large scale are 
used for consumption, the risk of a crisis mounts (Gould 1972, p. 199).  
Deregulation of the financial sector: Sachs et al (1996) mean that there is a clear connection 
between deregulation and privatization of the financial sector and a quick, domestic 
expansion of lending, which can end in banking crises. When the lending increases quickly it 
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becomes harder to assess the debtors’ ability to pay back. Problems with adverse selection 
and moral hazard grow. The surveillance of the banking system also tends to be insufficient 
during such periods (Sachs/Tornell/Velasco 1996, p. 4, 25f). In a liberalized environment, 
competition drives the banks to take higher risks and act carelessly. Even the established 
banks have a hard time keeping to their normal, careful practice, because it is the aggressive 
banks that profit in this phase. Bad banking practice tends to crowd out good (Mullineux 
1990, p. 78ff).  
Rigid exchange-rate regime: When the currency policy is some form of fixed exchange rate, 
the risk is considerable that the currency becomes strongly overvalued as a consequence of a 
higher inflation rate compared to the world around, which increases the vulnerability to a 
financial crisis. If the capital inflow ebbs, the deterioration in the capital balance can 
temporarily be faced with currency reserves, but in the longer term the current account deficit 
has to be cut. This can be accomplished either by a falling absorption, i.e. lower consumption, 
imports and so on, or by a real depreciation, which can be done through either a nominal 
depreciation or falling prices and wages (Sachs/Tornell/Velasco 1996, p. 2). If the nominal 
exchange rate is fixed or inert and if there are wage and price rigidities, it may be impossible 
to bring about the real depreciation that is needed (Edwards 1998, p. 21ff). Further, a fixed 
exchange rate can collapse in connection with a banking crisis because in such a situation the 
goal of keeping the exchange rate fixed is not compatible with the goal of stabilizing the 
financial system. The central bank can try to counter a banking crisis through keeping the 
interest rates low or by providing the banks with liquidity. But, then the actors will use the 
growing supply of domestic currency to buy foreign currency, which will force the authorities 
to abandon the fixed exchange rate (Chang/Velasco 1998, p. 4)  
Weak fiscal policies: A fiscal policy with large budget deficits and increasing public debts 
increases the aggregate demand, which can generate higher inflation than the surrounding 
world. This leads to an appreciating real exchange rate, which undermines external 
competitiveness and gives rise to a current account deficit (Kindleberger 1987, p. 7f). Sachs 
(1989b) has pointed to a pattern in Latin American countries with too expansive economic 
policy, which is often motivated by problems with poverty and inequality and has a 
background in social conflicts. The mounting public expenses lead to budget deficits, high 
inflation and falling real wages and end in serious balance of payment crises (Sachs 1989b, p. 
27f). Budget deficits can give rise to capital inflows from abroad if governments finance 
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higher public expenses directly through loans from abroad or indirectly via growing loans in 
the domestic market, which raises the interest rate level.  
Political shocks: A crisis often has an initiating factor, which may be of economical nature, 
but also political, for example a coup d’etat (Kindleberger 1978, p. 107f). If such political 
events do not directly trigger a crisis, they can contribute to aggravating it by causing and 
spreading economic uncertainty among key actors, such as foreign investors. Further, 
underlying social conflicts, which may grow out of large income differences, can also 
contribute to weakening the political institutions (Sachs 1989b, p. 7f) 
Crisis management: The central authorities, mainly the national government and the central 
bank, are faced with difficult decisions once the economy has started to run into problems. If 
they make the right choices, they can limit the damage to the economy and possibly avoid a 
full-blown crisis. If they fail, they can make the imbalances worse and the problems are likely 
to escalate into a financial crisis and possibly a crash.  
Large capital inflows, domestic credit expansion and government deficits can all cause the 
money supply to increase more than real output, which will result in inflation. This follows 
from the quantity theory of money, where the quantity of money determines the nominal 
value of total output (given constant velocity). The development of the money supply is a key 
factor in several of the explanations above.  
2.3. Method 
In this survey, I analyze both qualitative and quantitative data. First, the investigation is based 
on the study of research, of which I have summarized the central parts, and then tried to 
systematically account for certain aspects for each of the four periods. Second, I use some 
general explanations of financial crises put forward in section 2.2 to make a comparative 
analysis, to which certain quantitative, economic data are essential.  
2.4. Data 
The economic indicators are also crucial to the descriptive accounts and are gathered in the 
appendix. The data is collected from several sources, in part other researchers and in part 
official international statistics. Generally, I have preferred to use data from later sources, 
when possible, since there are sometimes updates on variables like GDP. In the appendix, I 
have a few more notes on some indicators.  
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3. Four financial crises 
3.1. The crisis of 1890-91 
From the middle of the 19th century, Argentina became more and more dependent on trade 
with Europe and North America. Between 1880 and 1913 the value of the export rose seven 
times (Ford 1962, p. 83) and 1870-1890 by on average 8,2 % annually (Miles 2002, p. 9). The 
transport revolution, the opening up of the Pampas, large scale immigration and population 
growth were important conditions for Argentina’s entrance into the world economy. In the 
1880s Argentina used large capital inflows to finance long-term investment projects in 
infrastructure. The crisis 1890-91 forms an interruption in this era until 1914 of strong, 
export-led growth, which transformed Argentina into one of the richest countries in the world. 
Joining the gold standard was an important economic goal in the 1881 monetary reform in 
order to become attractive to foreign investors. Argentina was on and off the gold standard 
from 1867 with periods of floating in between. In January 1885 gold was suspended again 
after less than two years of convertibility. The failure then was founded in poor confidence in 
a fixed exchange rate and in the fact that strong economic interests wanted a weaker currency. 
There was a tradition in economic policy to expand credit in times of crisis and thereby letting 
the exchange rate depreciate. This was a policy that suited the big landowners, who had 
strong interests in the export sector and most of the time practically controlled the presidency. 
President Roca’s goal to establish Argentina on the gold standard thus failed and the 
government fell the year after. The new government headed by president Celman changed 
course to an expansive policy supported by landowners and export interests. Gold 
convertibility was no longer on the agenda and the monetary policy became lax, which added 
to the investment boom driven by the foreign capital inflow (Ford 1962, p. 134ff, 150).  
In the late 1880s Argentina experienced a boom with rising export and import, but also a 
growing current account deficit and an exploding foreign borrowing. The boom was driven by 
the foreign capital inflow. Rising world market prices of agricultural products resulted in 
increasing Argentine export revenues in 1886-89, which strengthened the boom. The 
investment boom was reinforced by the domestic expansionary economic policy, so that the 
demand for imported goods and with that foreign currency was greater than the supply of 
foreign currency from export revenues and foreign loans. The result was a depreciating 
exchange rate. The growth of foreign borrowing collapsed completely in 1890-91. The import  
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Diagram 1: Exports, imports och foreign borrowing (million gold pesos), Argentina 
1884-1895 
 
(Ford 1962, p. 139 (no information available on borrowing 1892-94)) 
also decreased substantially with the financial crisis 1890-91. After 1895, there was an 
export-led recovery (Ford 1962, p. 140). 
British investments started in the 1860s and grew from 2,7 million pounds in 1865 to 479,8 
million pounds in 1913 (Stone 1977, p. 706). In 1878-81, the Argentine government laid the 
foundation to the investment boom by securing the Pampas area militarily, by establishing a 
strong national government headed by Julio Roca (1880-86), and by introducing a national 
currency, the peso (Ford 1962, p. 86f). In 1889, 40-50 % of the British foreign investments 
went to Argentina (Körnert 2003, p. 189). The Roca government obtained the first loan for 
two railway lines in 1881 and then the provincial governments established links to the coast. 
The city of Buenos Aires borrowed to expand and modernise the port and to invest in other 
infrastructure projects. The British bank, Baring Brothers, was focused on financing such 
public projects. Between 1888 and 1890 Barings invested 13,6 million pounds in Argentina,  
by far the largest sum of all foreign banks (Körnert 2003, p. 189). Around two thirds of the 
British capital that was invested in Argentina 1886-89 went into building railways. The 
Argentine government used an interest guarantee for investments in railways, which shifted 
investors’ focus from the profitability of the railway companies to the creditworthiness of the 
government (Eichengreen 2003, p. 194f). Most of the international capital was raised from 
bond issues in financial markets in developed countries. Towards the end of the 1880s the 
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current account deficit reached historically high levels, 20-30 % of GDP. After the Baring 
crash in 1890, the current account turned to a surplus, i. e. a minor outflow of capital. 
The principal factor driving the capital to Argentina and others was that the conditions for 
investments in Britain were poor during most of the 1880s with recession and low interest 
rates. Investors sought higher returns abroad, primarily securities in developing economies. 
Further, the competition between the foreign commercial banks in the Argentine bond market 
resulted in increasing capital inflows. Baring’s attempt to dominate the Argentine market was 
also a push to take over Rothschild’s role as the leading commercial bank. Another indication 
that the capital flow was determined primarily by exogenous factors was that capital 
continued to poor in despite lots of negative news about the development of the Argentine 
economy – the suspension of gold in 1885, the dramatically rising gold premium and money 
supply, the chronic budget deficits, corruption etc (Miles 2002, p. 14, 19ff). 
After the currency crisis 1885, a supervision authority was set up to restrain the banks in 
printing money. However, a decrete issued in October 1885 allowed the semi-official Banco 
Nacional to double its banknotes issue. Notes in circulation increased from 62 million paper 
pesos in 1884 to 89 millions in 1886. In 1887 the financial sector was liberalised through the 
passing of the Free banking law, which resulted in a dramatically rising number of banks, 
especially public sector banks. Other banks were also able to issue notes backed by 
government bonds, which they bought with money borrowed abroad. The fact that the foreign 
capital was channelled through the banks increased its effect on aggregate demand. The 
foreign capital financed the increasing expenses of the government and at the same time paid 
for the banks’ issues of bank notes. The financial stability was disturbed by these measures 
(Eichengreen 2003, p. 204f). The foreign capital poured into the country and simultaneously 
the bank notes issues rose by 38 % in 1888, by 26 % in 1889 and by 49 % in 1890. The 
demand for money rose with the fast economic growth, but did not keep pace with the supply 
of notes. Consequently, the exchange rate depreciated by 10 % in 1888, by 29 % in 1889 and 
by 31 % in 1890. The gold premium of the peso rose from par in 1884 to of 39 % in 1886 and 
91 % in 1889. 
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Diagram 2: Notes in circulation (mill paper pesos) and the gold premium 1884-1895 
 
(Ford 1962, p. 139) 
There were provincial banks in Argentina that borrowed abroad to provide the provincial 
governments with credit and back up the issues of bank notes. Some of these were banks only 
by name. Their actual role was to bring in the foreign capital that was needed for the expenses 
of the provincial governments. Some of them gave advances directly to politicians. There 
were reports that these banks falsified their balance sheets and stated that they had non-
existing dividends (Eichengreen 2003, p. 197).  
The financial liberalisation led to rising asset prices, more of speculations, frauds and 
wasteful credits, and the extensive capital inflow aggravated these phenomena. One example 
was the cedulas, mortgage bonds, which became much overvalued and threatened the stability 
of the financial sector (Eichengreen 2003, p. 197f). With the increase in export revenues and 
loans abroad followed a higher liquidity in the economy and consequently falling interest 
rates (until 1889). The great number of borrowers, including the national and provincial 
governments and authorities, led to an increase in the credit demand. Credit became looser, 
and the risk of a growing ratio of bad loans rose. The banking sector thus became more 
vulnerable to changes in the capital flow. Pressure on the currency also increased. The 
wasteful credit practices should be viewed in the light that the government later rescued the 
banks in the wake of the crash (Miles 2002, p. 8). 
In 1889 there were signals of diminishing growth, which caused alarm over the Argentine 
economy’s ability to service the foreign debt. Eichengreen (2003) maintains that the cause of 
the slowing growth in Argentina at the end of the 1880s, was that too little of the capital 
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inflow was saved and directed into investments. 60 % of the increase in imports 1886-1890 
came in the form of consumption, according to Eichengreen. Dramatically rising prices at the 
end of the 1880s indicates that the domestic consumption was over-stimulated. Real estate 
sales were ten times bigger in 1889 compared to 1886 and the national savings decreased after 
1885 (Eichengreen 2003, p. 198ff). Taylor’s (1997) figures show a negative savings ratio 
1886-1890. Low wages and a high share of the population below 15 years or over 65 also give 
reasons to believe that the propensity to consumption was high (Taylor 2003, p. 179).
1
  
In 1889, the business cycle in England recovered strongly. Bank of England raised its 
discount rate from 2,5 % to 6 % in the course of six months, followed by other central banks. 
The result was that investments in other countries became less profitable. This contributed to 
Barings’ failure in placing the Buenos Aires Water supply and drainage company ltd (BWSD) 
loan in the market. This failed emission precipitated the crisis for the bank. New British 
emissions to Argentina fell from 23 million pounds in 1888 to 12 million pounds in 1889 and 
5 million pounds in 1890 (Eichengreen 2003, p. 193).  
In the spring of 1889 the government failed to get a conversion loan accepted. The 
government wanted to pay for public bonds denominated in gold with depreciated paper 
money, which in practice meant a partial default (della Paolera/Gallo, p. 373). Instead, the 
government sold off gold and took new loans in Europe in order to hold back the depreciation 
of the currency and maintain the liquidity in the financial markets. It used its reserves in order 
to postpone adjustment measures.  
From a fiscal point of view, the years 1887-90 were among the worst in the history of 
Argentina. During Celman’s reign the public debt ratio of GDP increased dramatically and the 
country’s finances grew increasingly weaker. 708 million gold pesos were borrowed from 
abroad in 1885-1890, 35 % of which were public sector loans. These almost 250 million gold 
pesos meant that the public debt grew more than three times during this period. In 1890 this 
debt build-up had increased the yearly debt service to 60 million gold pesos (from 28 million 
in 1884), which was equivalent to 60 % of the export revenues (Ford 1962, p. 140f).  
Inflation rose quickly at the end of the 1880s as a result of the large budget deficits and the 
lax monetary policy. In the years 1889-1891 the yearly increase in price index was 21 %, 40  
                                                 
1
 According to Miles (2002) it was rather a matter of an investment boom. He points to Ford’s (1962) statistics of total 
imports, which show that the share of capital goods rose from 1884 to 1889, while the share of consumption goods fell. With 
the (temporarily) high export prices in the years 1887-89, Argentina was seen as a reliable borrower (Miles 2002, p. 9). 
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Diagram 3: Price index and nominal public debt (mill pesos) (, 1884-1893 
 
(Taylor 1997, p. 37 for price index and Flandreau & Zumer 2004 for public debt) 
% and 56 % respectively. Inflation and currency depreciation had undermined real wages and 
unrest among workers spread in 1889. 
The increasing inflation in Argentina resulted in drastically rising costs of servicing the 
foreign debt. When the capital flow turned around at the beginning of the 1890s, these costs 
became a heavy economic burden for the nation. The ratio of debt service increased from 23 
% of exports in 1885 to 60 % in 1890. The public share of the 60 million gold pesos that were 
paid in debt service in 1890 was 28 millions, or 47 % (Ford 1962, p. 139ff).  
The budget deficit of the national government in 1890-91 exceeded 68 % of its revenues. The 
provincial government also ran deficits. Local authorities financed their expenses by taking 
loans abroad. The miserable state of Argentina’s public finances came into focus in 1889 and 
then president Celman tried to cut expenses and increase revenues, but tax hikes met with 
strong resistance from the opposition and unions. In April 1890 the new Minister of Finance 
José Uriburu proposed higher customs duties by 15 %, but after riots and resistance from 
wealthy interest groups Celman chose to sack Uriburu. The government postponed measures 
to deal with the deficit and political unrest increased the uncertainty concerning the 
government’s ability to handle the situation (Eichengreen 2003, s. 188, 196).  
The foreign loans fell precipitously in 1890, but the payments only diminished slowly, which 
led the gold premium to rise dramatically from 151 % in 1890 to on average 287 % in 1891. 
With stagnating economic growth, the big banks ended up in financial difficulties. At the 
13 
 
same time the world market prices of agricultural products fell in 1890, which meant that it 
was practically impossible to compensate the decline in foreign capital by raising export 
revenues. 
In March 1890, the government reserves were exhausted and the Banco Nacional was 
virtually bankrupt. Pressure grew on Barings. As a result of the economic stagnation, there 
were no payments from BWSD and other investments, and the Argentine government had 
serious problems servicing the national debt (Körnert 2003, p. 190). The government tried to 
raise funds by selling the public railways, which contributed to protests in the capital. Buenos 
Aires saw violent clashes between forces from the militant party Union Civica and 
government forces and a failed coup in July. This political unrest made it all the harder for 
Argentina to raise money in the international capital market and it led to president Celman’s 
resignation in August 1890. The new Pellegrini government announced a plan to reduce the 
loans of the provinces and counties and to guarantee their debt. It tried to restore the creditors’ 
confidence by raising taxes and customs duties on imported consumption goods. In October, 
Barings’s problems became acute. The bank was forced to borrow large sums in order to meet 
its obligations. Early in November, the leading London bank was on the brink of ruin, which 
threatened the City’s position as the world financial centre. The so called Rothschild 
committee was formed to rescue Barings and to reconstruct Argentina’s debt. Banco Nacional 
was forced to pay the short term debts and accept that Barings was leased from the last part of 
the BWSD loan (Eichengreen 2003, p. 207f). 
Barings was rescued to live on another century and the City of London thus escaped the crisis. 
To Argentina the consequences were worse. In January 1891 an agreement with the Bank of 
England was reached, which included a moratorium on large parts of the Argentine debt 
(Rock 1986, p. 60f). Payments on the public debt were cancelled. The terms of the agreement 
included reforms to bring down the inflation rate. This meant a stop to bailing out the banks. 
Consequently, a banking crisis broke out in January 1891. Late in the spring the entire 
banking sector was infected. Only one bank in Argentina, the Bank of London and the River 
Plate, managed to stay open (Eichengreen 2003, p. 208f). The consequences to Argentina’s 
real economy were devastating. The drastic adjustment of the current account balance was 
accomplished by reducing imports, which resulted in a contraction in the economy.  
In a historic perspective the development at the end of the 1880s and during the crisis at the 
beginning of the 1890s is unprecedented. In the boom of 1887-89 GDP grew on average by 
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more than 13 % per year and in total by 44 % over three years. The fall of 1890-91 amounted 
to 15 % and was the deepest recorded (Taylor 1997, p. 37). The investment ratio went from 
11-16 % of GDP at the end of the 1880s to 6-7 % of GDP during most of the 1890s (Taylor 
2003, p. 177).  
3.2. Argentina during the great depression 1929-32 
In the 1920s Argentina was the leading economy in Latin America. Growth was high, 
harvests were exceptionally good, and a final round of railroads was built. Argentina was a 
free trading-nation, dominant in grain and meat exports, and with the demand from the 
industrialized countries in Europe driving its economy. During the four years 1926-1929 
annual real GDP growth averaged 5,7 %, industrial production 5,2 % and exports 4,8 %. 
National external debt was in 1929 41,8 % of exports (Eichengreen/Portes 1985, p. 10).  
In the 1920s the investment levels were fairly high in Argentina and finance came to some 
extent from foreign capital. In the years 1920-24 there was an average current account deficit 
of 6 % of GDP. The net capital flow from abroad was markedly lower during the second half 
of the decade with a deficit around 2 %, although it rose in 1929 and hit 9,5 % in 1930. The 
inflows in the late 1920s were considerably lower than during the period 1885-89. The 
international capital flow in the 1920s was procyclical and thereby had a destabilizing effect 
on the debtor economies. Gross capital outflow from the US rose strongly all through the 
1920s from around 650 million USD in 1920 to 1 570 million USD in 1928. The investment 
bank Morgan dominated the foreign lending to Argentina (Eichengreen 2003, p. 34). It was 
mainly the Argentine government that via the bond market borrowed from international banks 
(Taylor 1997, p. 7).  
During the boom period from 1900 to 1914 hade Argentina had built up considerable gold 
reserves, and these were well economized until the mid-1920s. This gave the currency a 
strong backing. The monetary policy 1914-27 was aimed at rejoining the gold standard. In 
August 1927 Argentina reached this goal, now at a different parity (Bordo/Kydland 1995, p. 
437). The monetary policy was run by a currency board, which exchanged domestic currency 
for gold at the given rate. With a fixed exchange rate and a free flow of capital, it was not 
possible to control the nominal money supply. The money supply will in such a system, 
where the authorities play by the rules, vary with the gold assets. Even during the period 
1914-1927 when convertibility had been given up, Argentina for the most part continued to 
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comply with the gold standard rules. The background was that the experiences of expansive 
monetary policy during the 1880s and earlier and the inflation and economic chaos that those 
crises had caused was a vivid memory among the decision makers of Argentina. The fear of 
inflation made their faith in the gold standard strong (della Paolera and Taylor 1998, p. 12f).  
Argentina’s financial development was stagnant during the interwar years. The equity market 
was undeveloped, so long-term credit was scarce. The real money supply (M3) per capita was 
stationary from 1920 on, as was the money supply (M1) as ratio of GDP. The banks had 
become more important to channel savings, but the expansion was inadequate, especially if 
excluding the official Banco de la Nación (BNA), that was set up to supervise the financial 
sector. Between 1910 and 1930 the domestic private banks’ share of the total lending dropped 
from almost 50 % to less than 35 %, and the BNA:s share increased from 28 % to 45 % (the 
remaining 20 % to foreign banks). In the crisis of 1914 and 1922-23 the domestic banks lost 
most of their capital, and by 1930 they had not come back to the prewar level. Although 
savings accounts expanded, the national savings did not grow fast enough to stimulate 
economic growth (della Paolera and Taylor 1997, p. 1ff). The savings quota rose only slowly 
after 1914 and was on average on 8 % of GDP. The investment ratio dropped to around 10 % 
of GDP compared with 15-16 % before 1914. At the end of the 1920s the savings and 
investments ratios were however higher than before, but in the beginning of the 1930s both 
fell sharply. 
The BNA:s strong dominance also made the system vulnerable to political manipulations and 
crony finance. The BNA supported and saved the banking sector time after time without 
having made any such promises in advance. Yet, it had no official status as central bank and 
lender of last resort. Those who benefited from this were the owners of the other banks, who 
got backing for the risks they had taken and the bad loans that otherwise threatened to ruin 
them. Some of the bad loans had been granted to themselves or their companies in banks that 
asked the BNA for help (della Paolera and Taylor 1997, p. 10). The BNA even lent the banks 
funds to a lower interest than what its customers got on their deposits. Gradually a big 
problem of moral hazard evolved, which meant considerable risks to the whole system (della 
Paolera/Taylor 2002, p. 370).  
The financial system thus failed in its two microeconomic tasks: it could not mobilize more 
capital and it could not allocate the capital so that effenciency improved. Further, being 
without a lender of last resort made it weak in case an external shock would lead to a bank 
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run. Under the gold standard rules the currency board was obliged to keep the share of gold 
assets in relation to the money supply unchanged, which gave it little room for providing 
liquidity to the banks in a crisis (della Paolera and Taylor 1997, p. 9ff).  
The fiscal policy during the interwar years was orthodox and practically remained so into the 
1930s. The aim was budget balance. A large share of the revenues came from customs taxes, 
which varied cyclically with trade. Therefore in recessions deficits were run up, but normally 
they were small. In 1928 the budget deficit was 1,7 % of GDP.  
Politically, a power balance had emerged in the1920s between the two big parties – the 
Radicals, which represented the middle class and industrial interest groups, lead the 
government, while the conservatives, representing the big landowners, the church and the 
military, controlled the senate. The country was nevertheless ruled mostly with respect to the 
export economy, which kept its leading position through the decade (Rojas, p. 189f). The 
popular Hipólito Yrigoyen, a Radical, had served a first period as president in 1916-1922 and 
returned in 1928. The conservative party had seen its share of the votes fall and the Radicals 
had the control of the senate within reach. Conservative and fascist militaries conspired 
against his government. 
In 1928-29 developing countries were hit by double shocks. First, the American capital export 
ebbed in 1928, because the boom on Wall Street lured investors and because the Fed raised 
the discount rate in 1928 in order to hold back the hausse in stocks. From 1929, there were 
capital inflows to USA instead of outflows. Then, the primary goods export diminished 
quickly due to the strong decline in the US business cycle, which started in the summer of 
1929. In 1929, USA accounted for more than half of the world industrial production and its 
industrial output fell 25 % between October 1929 and October 1930 (Eichengreen/Portes 
1985, p. 14f). These two shocks strongly affected the demand in the debtor countries. They 
also contributed to the third shock, the global, steep decline in prices. This deflation put 
further pressure on debitors and affected business confidence negatively. Argentina, like other 
primary exporters, was hit by a terms of trade shock (down 34 % between 1928 and 1931) 
starting early in 1929. The general price level dropped in 1929.  
Argentina chose in December 1929 to limit the gold convertibility. The dramatic decline in 
exports revenues had made it practically impossible to reduce imports enough to avoid large 
deficits in the balance of payments. Reserves had diminished, which reduced the money 
supply. The deepening deflation also strengthened the influence of the groups who wanted to 
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Diagram 4: Exports and imports (million pesos, current prices) and terms of trade, 
1923-1932 
 
 (Taylor 1997, p. 38 for exports and imports; Francis 2013 p. 295f, 301 for terms of trade) 
ease the rules of the gold standard. So, the currency board was shut to protect the gold 
reserve. During the following year the peso fell by 25 % and by 1934 it had lost 60 % of its 
value (Aldaheff 1986, p. 103). Another reason for the decision to get off the gold standard 
was the bad state of the financial sector. The balance sheets of the banks, even the BNA, had 
deteriorated, the share of bad loans grew and the reserve quotas fell. With the reentrance into 
the gold standard in 1927, it would not be possible to continue the rescue actions as before. 
The confidence in the ability of the banks to adjust to this change was however very low. 
More and more people chose to withdraw their funds from the banks and the demand for gold 
increased. This growing pressure came to an end when the decision was taken to jump off the 
gold standard (della Paolera/Taylor 2002, p. 381).  
In the first half of 1930 the international capital flow returned to the extent that the American 
lending reached its highest level since the First World War. The Argentine government 
secured a new loan amounting to 50 million US$ in April 1930, but only for six months. The 
banks were put under pressure from the lack of credit and now voices were heard demanding 
the government act to counteract the decline in foreign capital. But, the government was not 
prepared to alter its monetary policy further. The effects of deflation on business were 
gradually felt more and more. President Yrigoyen was given the blame for the depression.  In 
September 1930 the Yrigoyen government was overthrown in a military coup. A military 
government headed by general Uriburu took over. The new government threw out all Radical  
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Diagram 5: Inflation rate (annual change, %) and government deficit in Argentina 1923-
1932 (% of GDP) 
 
(Bordo 2002) 
politicians and officials from leading posts and barred them from running in the election in 
1931. After the election a conservative government was formed by general Justo.  
The budget deficit rose with the onset of the depression which made revenues from import 
duties fall dramatically. In 1930 the deficit was 4,4 % of GDP. In September 1930 general 
Uriburu reaffirmed that a balanced budget was a basic goal. Between 1930 and 1932 expenses 
were cut by 22 % (Aldaheff 1986, p. 96ff). Income and wealth taxes were raised. The purpose 
was also to attract foreign capital through low inflation and limited deficits and the 
government was convinced that the crisis was only temporary.  
By 1930 the budget deficit, the deflation and the depreciation had increased the burden of the 
public debt. The debt service went up from 18 % of the budget in 1930 to 29 % in 1932 (della 
Paolera and Taylor 1998, p. 13). During 1914-1930 the most part of the increase in the public 
debt had come from domestic sources, and from 1929 debt service to domestic creditors cost 
more than to external ones (Aldaheff 1986, p. 102f). The external part of the public debt had 
increased from 6 % to 11 % of exports in 1930 and continued up to around 14-15 % the 
following years, mainly an effect of the fall in exports. The larger part of the foreign debt was 
private, mainly British direct investments, and the total foreign debt service reached 33 % of 
exports in 1931-32.  
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The international lending to Latin America was almost wiped out after the default of Bolivia 
in January 1931. Even though Argentina was also struck by the price falls and experienced 
political unrest, the country was somewhat of an exception from the turmoil in the rest of 
Latin America. The Argentine government carried out its foreign debt service punctually and 
in full. Only a few provinces and local authorities were forced to default on their debt. When 
the international capital markets collapsed in the beginning of the 1930s the government 
resorted to domestic loans. The supply of credit to the government was all along great because 
of its irreproachable debt service (Aldaheff 1986, p. 100ff). That Argentina, unlike most other 
Latin American countries, managed to continue its foreign debt service meant however that 
the economic policy was more deflationary than it needed to be. The reason for this priority 
was Argentina’s dependence on trade with Great Britain, its biggest creditor, and the fear of 
losing its favoured trade status (Maddison 1985, p. 25). 
In April 1931, there was a shift in the monetary policy that strongly contributed to Argentina 
managing to avoid default and devastating deflation. Until then the gold reserves of Argentina 
were equivalent to around 80 % of the monetary base, which also had been a target for the 
monetary policy, even after convertibility was given up in 1929. Now, this target was given 
up and instead the authorities focused on the nominal money supply. The ratio of domestic 
credit to the monetary base was allowed to rise and the gold share dropped from 78 % in 1929 
to 43 % in 1932. The currency board started to issue domestic currency in exchange for 
private and government securities. In that way the reduction in the money supply was stopped  
Diagram 6: Money base in Argentina 1928-1934 (million pesos) 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
gold domestic credit
 
(della Paolera/Taylor 1998, p. 5) 
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with the purpose of avoiding deflation. The real increases in liquidity were fairly small, but an 
important change in expectations was accomplished. After this change the gold reserve was 
partly used for paying foreign debts, which also made it possible to continue a tight fiscal 
policy and stay creditworthy in the international markets (della Paolera and Taylor 1998, p. 1, 
6, 17ff). 
In September 1931, Great Britain gave up the gold standard, which affected Argentina 
severely. The peso depreciated sharply against the dollar. When the depreciation accelerated, 
the money supply was allowed to expand independently of the variations of the gold reserves. 
Moreover, the government imposed currency controls, encouraged import substitution 
(Prebisch 1986, p. 133ff) and later introduced import licenses.  
Argentina escaped bank crashes in the beginning of the 1930s due to considerable amounts of 
credit for commercial banks from BNA. Rediscounts rose from 92 million pesos in 1928 to 
156 million in 1929 and 285 million in 1931 (della Paolera and Taylor 2002, p 365). Through 
the depression the BNA continued to lend both to private banks and to the government. 
Through the rediscounts a lot of bad loans in the banks were transferred to the BNA. This is 
what saved the banks and avoided financial collapse. Some see these actions as an expression 
of the corrupt “gaucho banking” that we know from the 1880s. Powerful interests needed 
cover from the risks that they had taken (della Paolera/Taylor 2002, p. 382ff).  
The world depression dealt a severe economic blow to Argentina through the fall in export 
volume, the big terms of trade-loss and the decline in capital inflows. The real GDP fell for 
three consecutive years by 14 % from top (1929) to bottom (1932). Real GDP per capita fell 
by 19 % from 1929 to 1932. The fall in real income was even greater, when the terms of 
trade-effect is taken into account (Maddison 1985, p. 18ff). It was Argentina’s longest 
contraction, but not the deepest (Sturzenegger and Moya 2003, p. 92). The economy 
recovered strongly after 1932, but in the longer term the depression meant a structural shift 
from an export-oriented, agricultural-based economy to an inward-looking industrial one.  
3.3. The crisis of 1980-82 
The 1970s and 1980s were characterized by political turmoil, which made the economic 
problems worse. After the death of Juan Péron in 1974, the Peronist movement was 
increasingly split and the political violence intensified. Militant leftist groups rebelled and 
clashed with the military and rightist death squads. Extensive strikes in 1975-76 paralysed 
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parts of the economy. The government of Isabel Péron lost control over the situation and was 
overthrown in a military coup in March 1976 led by General Jorge Videla. During the military 
dictatorship a brutal repression prevailed and tens of thousands of people disappeared or were 
murdered. Yet, the Videla government ruled rather steadily for several years. As a result of 
recurring recessions and the economic policy, the income differences increased and the real 
wages sank.  
In 1976, Argentina altered its economic policy to become much more market oriented. The 
starting point was that the policy of import substitution and state interventions had restrained 
the economic development. Protection against external competition was dismantled, and 
exports supported, which initially was done through devaluations and in the longer run 
through combating inflation. The financial markets were also deregulated (Bulmer-Thomas 
1994, p. 334ff). Large parts of the industry could not face the competition from abroad and 
many firms went bankrupt, when the state protections were removed. The effect of this 
economic shift in combination with oil crisis and recession was in practice an industrial 
collapse (Barbero/Rocchi 2003, p. 289). Between 1975 and 1987 the number of employed in 
Argentine industry diminished by close to 40 %, but the productivitiy increased strongly and 
the industrial exports rose quickly during the years 1975-79 (Rojas 2002, p. 91).  
The inflation early in 1976 had risen to around 5 000 % and the industrial production had  
Diagram 7: Inflation rate (GDP deflator, annual change in %) and public sector budget 
deficit (% of GDP) in Argentina 1974-1983 
 
(World Development Indicators 2015; Dornbusch/de Pablo 1987, p. 24) 
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decreased substantially, so the highest priorities of the new government was to stabilize the 
economy through a tight fiscal policy. Soon the inflation had crept down under 200 % 
(Dornbusch 1987a, p. 6f). The military government cut down both wages and budget deficits, 
deregulated prices and slashed subsidies. The large sector of state companies was downsized. 
In four years, the monetary policy reduced the inflation rate from 438 % in 1976 to below 100 
% in 1980. 
The oil crisis in 1973 resulted in deteriorating terms of trade and rising budget deficits. 
Argentina and other Latin American countries expanded their way through the recession, 
partly because borrowed money was easy to come by and relatively cheap on account of the 
high inflation rate (Maddison 1985, p. 45). The liquidity of the world economy in the 1970s 
was unusually large, not least from the recycling of petrodollars. In developed countries 
inflation was high, growth was weak and real rates low, so capital flowed to countries with 
better returns. Most of the capital came in the form of syndicated American bank loans.  
The new economic policy also included a reform of the financial sector that began in 1977 
with privatizations of banks and deregulations. The reform resulted in a quick growth of the 
ratio of credits to GDP, which was also the purpose. The domestic financial liberalization 
made the banks more active and the granting of credits became less cautious 
(Sachs/Tornell/Velasco 1996, p. 25f). Minimum bank reserve requirements were drastically 
cut, the number of financial firms rose and between 1976 and 1980 the whole financial sector 
grew by 45 %. Seven bigger commercial banks that had been nationalized by the Peronist 
government 1973-76 were returned to their old, private owners after 1976 (Munck 1985, p. 
59). The international banks also set up branches. The quick growth of the sector however 
also attracted new entrepreneurs who were more risk prone than more experienced actors. 
Further, strong bonds were established between banks and groups of companies, which gave 
rise to an oligopolistic market and to a very high indebtedness in many private firms. The 
central bank’s supervision was inadequate, which partly was a reaction to the strict regulation 
that prevailed until 1976 (Diaz-Alejandro 1985, p. 13f). The credit expansion consisted also 
mostly of short-term lending, which made the private capital more volatile.  
A large share of the new supply of credits was allocated into real estate and speculation. 
Further, the large inflow of funds from the western banks and governments went partly to 
politicians who cooperated with the military regime, and to officers who emptied big state 
companies (Shachar 1992, p. 143f). There was also a big increase in imports of durable 
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consumption goods and weapons, and in the public consumption (de Vylder 1991, p. 32). A 
large part of the foreign loans was thus used for consumption, corruption and for the 
government budget deficit.  
The savings fell strongly after 1977. From 33,7 % of GDP in 1977 it sank to 18,5 % in 1983 
and decreased further to 13,8 % in 1989. The investments followed the same path, but did not 
dwindle quite as much due to the negative current account balance from 1979 and on. To 
compensate for the reduction in savings and avoid a big investment fall, Argentina resorted to 
net borrowing from abroad. As in other developing countries with the same sharp decrease in 
the ratio of gross savings to GDP, Argentina also got problems with its debt service (Lanyi 
1987, p. 35f). 
The military government also started with a significant devaluation and chose a fixed 
exchange rate supported by a currency board. This rigid arrangement strengthened confidence 
in the currency, but carried risks in case of a crisis, as it barred the authorities from acting as 
lender of last resort and adding liquidity to the system (Eichengreen 1996, p. 181ff). Currency 
controls were removed. The economy was opened to the world and the capital flows soared, 
which made it hard to control the money supply. The inflation rate was, although lower, still 
too high. In December 1978 the government launched the Tablita plan with a crawling peg. 
The rate of depreciation was preannounced, which aimed at pressing down inflation. Initially, 
this policy enjoyed high credibility, as the central bank had large international reserves and  
Diagram 8: Real exchange rate and nominal depreciation 1975-1983 
 
(Dornbusch 1987/de Pablo 1987, p. 22 for real exchange rate; Maddison 1985, p. 57 for rate of depreciation) 
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the economy had shown a surplus of the current account balance in recent years. However, the 
inflation rate remained high, which meant that the real exchange rate was becoming 
increasingly overvalued (Maddison 1985, p. 56). Early on, the high interest rates and the 
preannounced rate of depreciation led to an almost risk-free speculation in Argentine assets. 
The private sector started to take up large loans abroad to profit from the lower interest rates 
there and a massive capital inflow evolved (Dornbusch 1987, p. 11f).  
Over time the confidence in the currency policy eroded. The reason was in part that the 
current account balance turned into a deficit due to the high inflation and a large demand for 
imports, and in part that the large international capital flows gave rise to a strong credit 
expansion. At the end of 1979 the real interest rates started to climb and the unfolding 
recession led to falling profits. The expansion of the financial sector had made many banks 
vulnerable because of potentially bad loans (Fanelli/Machinea 1994, p. 5f).  
The capital inflow was mirrored in substantial increases in both the foreign exchange reserve 
and the private external debts and was sustained until the beginning of 1980. Then the public 
sector took over the capital import. Especially in 1979 the capital balance showed a big 
surplus. The foreign exchange reserve was heavily positive that year, resulting in a small 
deficit in the current account balance, which grew the following years. 
Diagram 9: Argentina’s current account balance, trade balance and change in foreign 
exchange reserves 1977-1985 (million USD) 
 
(Fanelli/Machinea 1994, p. 11) 
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From 1979 and on resistance from the unions grew. A general strike was carried out in April 
1979 and occupations of factories and street demonstrations followed (Munck 1985, p. 66). In 
1980 the international recession started to have effect and unemployment rose quickly, which 
made the military government more and more unpopular. This development increased the 
social and political tensions and with them the resistance to the government and its policies.  
The international recession was founded in part in the second oil crisis and in part in the 
change of economic policy in USA. After the high inflation rates of the 1970s, combating 
inflation was given top priority when Paul Volcker took over the Fed in 1979 and Ronald 
Reagan as president in 1981. The Fed raised the rates heavily. The Treasury bill rate adjusted 
for CPI averaged 1,3 % in the 1960s and during the 1970s -1,1 %. In 1980-85 rates rose to on 
average 3,5 %, a historically very high level (Dornbusch 1987b, p. 74). The effect was that 
the dollar appreciated strongly in the early 1980s. Large tax cuts and expanded military 
expenses resulted in a growing American budget deficit and consequently a big credit 
demand. Foreign capital was drawn to USA (Eichengreen 1996, p. 146f). 
For Argentina terms of trade turned up again in 1979-1981, but by then the world recession 
caused the market potential for Argentine exports to deteriorate, as for most developing 
countries. Export revenues declined 1979-80, but the import expenses rose dramatically. The 
trade balance was negative in 1980-1981, as was the current balance. Foreign private lending 
Diagram 10: Exports and imports of goods and services (bill constant pesos) and 
terms of trade, 1974-1984  
 
(World Development Indicators 2015 for exports and imports; Easterly 2001 (GDF/WDI) for terms of trade) 
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continued until 1982. At the same time, rising real rates and dollar increased the value of 
foreign debts. The great accumulated debts now became a problem.  
Bonds and loans continued to go into the private sector until 1982 (table 1), but the private 
sector netto was negative already in 1980, which is explained by the capital flight, especially 
extensive in 1980-81. In 1982-83 there were big flows from IMF, compensating for the 
outflow of other capital.  
In 1979-1980 the overvaluation of the peso had become so extreme that the financial markets 
anticipated a major depreciation. The lack of capital controls made it easier for the capital to 
flee the country. Private speculators bought dollars and placed them in bank accounts abroad. 
Some of these banks in for example USA had lent large sums to the Argentine government, 
money that in part thus came back in the form of capital flight. In 1979-1980 the central bank 
had to borrow enormous sums in foreign currency to defend the exchange rate. The public 
part of the foreign debt exploded, while the private part diminished (Dornbusch/de Pablo 
1987, p. 6ff). 
In March 1980 the problems in the financial sector became grave. Banco de Intercambio 
Regional went bust, which created a crisis of confidence and dragged several financial firms 
along. Other banks were taken over by the central bank (Munck 1985, p. 60). The deposits in 
the domestic banks sank drastically and since these banks could not reduce their lending as 
fast, serious imbalances arose in their balance sheets. The authorities answered to the capital 
flight by tougher reserve requirements, which if anything made the situation worse 
(Fanelli/Machinea 1994, p. 7f). In the end, more than 70 institutions representing 35 % of 
financial sector assets were liquidated or under state control (Reinhart/Rogoff 2009, p. 349).  
In the early 1980s the government lost control over the public expenses. The budget deficit 
reached over 18 % of GDP in 1982. The causes were defence of the exchange rate and the 
debt crisis in combination with the rising costs of unemployment and lower tax revenues that  
Table 1: Argentina’s capital account excluding change in reserve assets 1977-1983 in 
million US$ 
 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Capital balance, total 936 165 4 979 1 972 1 193 1643 4 145 
~ to public sector 973 1 449 1 276 2 997 4 624 209 2 403 
~ to private sector 216 -83 3 639 -743 -3 469 -4 017 -2 514 
* bonds and loans 393 514 3 543 3 886 3 112 -521 -1 831 
~ flows from IMF -253 -1 201 65 -281 38 5 451 4 256 
(Fanelli/Machinea 1994, p. 11ff) 
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followed from the recession. The external debt swelled from US$ 7,7 billion in 1975 to US$ 
35,7 billion in 1981. Total external debt as a share of exports rose from 172 % in 1978 to 472 
% in 1983 and it had escalated to 46,1 billion US$ in 1983. The enlarged burden of debt 
service added to the budget deficit. This resulted in an increased money supply and higher 
inflation rate. The financial markets reacted by escaping to non-monetary assets.  
In February 1981 the coming economy minister, Lorenzo Sigaut, indicated that devaluation 
was imminent. This triggered a massive capital flight. During the first quarter of 1981 3,8 
billion dollars flowed out of the country. In March, the international reserves had diminished 
so heavily that the currency policy broke down (Fanelli/Machinea 1994, p. 5f). The crisis also 
brought in a new government under president Viola with a new currency policy. The peso was 
devalued more than once and double exchange rates were introduced, but without currency 
controls capital flight continued (Maddison 1985, p. 56). 
In December 1981 a third general, Leopoldo Galtieri, took over. The government budget 
deficit increased heavily due to bailout of banks, a mounting burden of foreign debt service 
and aggravating terms of trade. The inflation rate soared again. The country faced bankruptcy. 
It reached the bottom when the military regime decided to invade the Falkland Islands in 
April 1982 and go to war with Great Britain. This speeded up inflation and capital flight as 
well as the loss of confidence in the government. Following the defeat in the war in June, 
there was another currency crisis in July. After massive losses of foreign exchange reserves, 
the government resorted to a huge devaluation and currency controls (Berlinski 2002, p. 215). 
In July a last general, Reynaldo Bignone, temporarily took over and led a transition 
government until elections could be held in October 1983. This government tried to stimulate 
the economy with wage increases, debt relief for companies and at the same time sought to 
check the inflation with price controls. Currency controls were reintroduced and customs 
tariffs were raised. But, the inflation rate continued to rise. The situation deteriorated 
dramatically in August 1982, when Mexico defaulted on its debt. The international banks 
reacted uniformly and quickly pulled out of Latin America. Late in 1982, an IMF loan was 
arranged to refinance Argentina’s foreign debt and the economic policy anew became more 
restrictive with a tight budget and higher interest rates (Maddison 1985, p. 46ff, 57).  
The consequences of the debt crisis and the economic collapse were close to catastrophic for 
Argentina. The decline was protracted and deep. The real GDP growth fell over 10 % in 
1981-82 and the real income per capita sank 13 %. Between 1945 and 1975 the per capita 
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Diagram 11: Real GDP growth (%) and real GDP per capita (constant US$, 2005) in 
Argentina 1974-1983  
 
(World Development Indicators, 2015) 
income had risen by on average 1,7 % per year, but from 1975 to 1985 it fell by the same 
figure (Dornbusch/de Pablo 1987, p. 3ff). The problems were not overcome, and at the end of 
the decade growth dropped even deeper and real incomes collapsed. The development was 
without competition the worst among the big Latin American economies.  
3.4. The crisis 2001-02 
The hyperinflation and the break-down of the economic policy in 1989 led to the early 
resignation of president Alfonsín, who was succeeded by the Peronist Carlos Ménem. Ménem 
carried out a series of reforms in line with a debt restructuring programme. This reform 
package was called Convertibility plan, designed by the economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, 
and legislated in April 1991. It was the centre of a total shakeup of the economic policy and 
finally brought about a stabilization of the economy.  Its foundation was that the exchange 
rate of a new currency was fixed to the dollar through a currency board. This dollar link could 
only be altered through legislation. Sterilizations of the capital flows were banned. The capital 
balance was completely liberalized. The fiscal policy was tightened and the central bank was 
forbidden to finance budget deficits. Further, there were extensive privatizations, trade 
liberalizations and microeconomic deregulations. The reforms resulted in a drastically 
reduced rate of inflation to only 4,2 % in 1994 and high GDP-growth, 7,8 % per year in 1991- 
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Diagram 12: Annual GDP-growth and price change (CPI) in Argentina 1993-2004 (%) 
  
(Ministry of Economy, 2006) 
94 (Sachs/Tornell/Velasco 1996, p. 41f). The trade balance improved. The Convertibility plan 
was a success and quickly restored confidence in money. 
The stabilization program included substantial downsizing of the public expenses and a 
strengthening of the revenues. Employment in state companies was slashed, a uniform value 
added tax implemented, tax administration sharpened, and prices of public services were 
raised. An extensive privatisation program initially produced results. The deficit of the 
consolidated public sector was by 1991 down to 1,8 % of GDP (Edwards 1996, p. 15f).  
The convertibility plan also allowed a dollarisation of the economy. Economic actors could 
choose the dollar for big transactions and to invest their assets. The purpose was to restore 
credibility of the peso and escape from the former recurrent use of inflation tax, since 
dollarisation further raised the political and economic costs of devaluation (della 
Paolera/Taylor 2003, p. 5, 11).  
The biggest trade partner was Brazil with 24 % of exports and imports (in 2000). USA:s share 
of Argentina’s total export and import was less than 15 %. To tie the currency to an economy 
that did not contribute more to the foreign trade was hence a risky measure, especially to an 
economy with such limited foreign trade in relation to GDP.  The trade with USA 
corresponded to less than 3 % of Argentina’s GDP (Perry/Servén 2003, p. 31f).  
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The currency peg and the lower inflation paved the way for a quick development of the 
financial sector. Public banks were privatized and the sector was liberalized. Until 1994 a 
substantial growth in lending took place. Problems with higher credit risks and inadequate 
supervision of banks soon surfaced (Sachs/Tornell/Velasco 1996, p. 25ff). 
In the contagion after Mexico’s Tequila crisis in 1994-95, nervous investors brought home 
their capital on a large scale. Collapse threatened the financial system and a dozen banks 
failed. A full-scale banking crash could be avoided through lowering the reserve-deposit 
ratios and the introduction of a limited depositor guarantee. The IMF, the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank offered support and restored some of the investors’ 
confidence (Sachs/Tornell/Velasco 1996, p. 43).  
The crisis 1995 made the Argentine authorities realise that the financial system needed 
strengthening. Ambitious reforms led to the consolidation and internationalization of the 
banking sector. In 1999 about half of the banking sector was owned by foreigners. The 
foreign banks’ share of the credit market rose from 18 % in 1994 to 48 % in 1999, which 
sharpened competition in the sector (Goldberg/Dages/Kinney 2000, p. 8f). Other reforms after 
the crisis in 1995 included tightened rules on supervision, audit and information, higher 
solvency and liquidity requirements, and an arrangement with international banks and the 
World Bank to manage a possible liquidity crisis (de la Torre/Yeyati/Schmukler 2002, p. 24f). 
Late in the 1990s the banking sector was considered very stable. The share of bad loans had 
however risen from 6 % in 1998 to over 10 % 2000 (Perry/Servén 2003, p. 49). 
After 1995 economic growth increased again. In 1990-98, GDP rose by almost 63 % and 
GDP per capita grew 47 % (WDI 2015). Ménem’s second period was, however, dominated by 
corruption, scandals and abuse of power, especially concerning the privatisations of public 
companies. These were sold off, but the prices of water, electricity and transports escalated. 
Unemployment rose markedly in the 1990s to on average 17 % 1995-1997 as a consequence 
of the productivity increase in the industry and the downsizing of the public sector. The 
results of this were growth of the black economy, sharpened social conflicts, and rising 
inequality of income distribution. When Cavallo had to leave office in 1996 the economic 
reforms stalled. In 1997, the Peronists lost their majority in parliament. 
From 1991, the government accomplished a surplus in the primary budget balance (excluding 
interest costs), of on average 0,14 % of GDP in 1991-2000, but this was not enough to pay the 
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interests of on average 2,4 % of GDP (Moreno 2002, p. 3). The interests mostly consisted of 
payments on foreign debt. Given that some revenues came from privatizations and that the 
pension debt was not included, the financial situation was actually worse than it seemed 
(Perry/Servén 2003, p. 33). The public sector had a permanent deficit for most of the 1990s.  
The tax collection was inefficient, and corruption and politically motivated jobs flourished, as 
decision makers on different levels used the public sector to win support from different 
groups. The central government had to share taxes with the provincial authorities that spent 
lavishly and decided most of their expenses themselves. Hence, Ménem could not control the 
finances even in the prosperous years (The Economist, 2002). Later, in recession, GDP 
decreased and unemployment costs rose. As a consequence of the deficits, the public debt 
grew, but until 1997 GDP grew fast enough to keep the debt to GDP ratio stable. The strategy 
had been to roll over the debts, but this didn’t work when growth fell. In 1993, the public debt 
service amounted to around 10 % of the revenue, but in 2001 it had reached around half of 
revenues (della Paolera/Irogoin/Bózzoli 2003, p. 74f). Over the period 1993-2001 the general 
government gross debt as a share of GDP increased from 25 % to 45 % (WEO 2014).  
Argentina’s total foreign debt increased from 27,7 % of GDP in 1993 to 47,1 % in 2001. The 
private sector accounted for most of this increase, but the government borrowed enormous 
sums in the domestic market. On the whole, banks and pension funds borrowed abroad and  
Diagram 13: General government gross debt and total external debt as ratio of GDP, 
1995-2004  
 
(WDI 2015 for external debt; WEO 2014 for public debt) 
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lent on to the government. After 1998, the driving force behind the escalation of the foreign 
debt was the government budget deficit (Perry/Servén 2003, p. 46f).  
The capital inflows were substantial all through the 1990s, especially during the years after 
the Tequila crisis. After Russia’s default in 1998 the capital flows diminished substantially 
globally and to Latin America.  
But, the decline to Argentina in 1999 was not drastic and no larger than for neighboring 
countries. It was not until 2001 that the capital flows to Argentina collapsed. The deficit in the 
current account balance was still around 3-4 % of GDP. However, when the capital inflows 
returned to the rest of Latin America in 2000, they continued to fall to Argentina, particularly 
in 2001. Perry/Servén draw the conclusion that most of the decline in the capital flows after 
1999 was an effect of specific circumstances in Argentina rather than a result of the global 
capital flows (Perry/Servén 2003, p. 13ff). 
In the financial sector some important problems grew. First, there were potentially bad loans 
with the banks in case the real exchange rate would be overvalued. A correction via deflation 
and unemployment would undermine the payment ability of debtors. Second, the persistent 
public budget deficits were to an increasing extent financed by the domestic banks and 
pension funds. The banks’ exposure to a possible government default increased drastically in 
2001. Third, the financial system lacked a lender of last resort, which made it vulnerable to 
mass withdrawals (de la Torre/Yeyati/Schmukler 2002, p. 6ff). 
Diagram 14: Current account balance, capital balance and changes in international 
reserves 1994-2004, million USD  
 
(Source: Ministry of Economy, 2006) 
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By 1999, the economy and the government seemed to be caught in a trap. The capital inflow 
diminished substantially and the cost of further loans rose heavily. The prices of Argentina’s 
export goods stopped rising, the dollar appreciated against other currencies and Argentina’s 
biggest trading partner, Brazil, devalued its currency by around 30 % in January 1999. GDP 
dropped in 1999 and deflation strenghtened. The recession made it harder to cut expenses and 
raise taxes and thereby aggravated the debt situation. Exports had grown in the 1990s, but not 
as fast as the foreign debt. The monetary regime ruled out devaluation and hence the costs had 
to be lowered in other ways. A series of privatizations had created private monopolies that 
continued to raise prices. Interest rates increased, but the wages fell, as unemployment grew, 
and this led to social unrest. All this increased doubts about convertibility.  
During most of the 1990s the real effective (trade weighted) exchange rate (REER) of 
Argentina appreciated strongly. A large part of this appreciation came about before 1994, and 
then the REER depreciated until 1996, whereupon it appreciated again to 2001. The 
appreciation before 1995 was probably not a problem, since productivity growth was so 
strong. After 1996 however, the balance of payments deteriorated and according to one 
estimate the real exchange rate was overvalued by around 50 % in 2000 (de la 
Torre/Yeyati/Schmukler 2002, p. 8). There were three main factors behind the overvaluation: 
the growing foreign debt, the rising dollar and Brazil’s devaluation. The appreciation of the 
dollar and Brazil’s devaluation were disturbances that demanded a real depreciation in 
Argentina (Perry/Servén 2003, s. 21ff). The prices actually fell, but rather modestly – in total 
by around 3 % in 1999-2001, which was not enough to correct the overvaluation of the peso. 
The national government was involved in a struggle against the provincial governments and 
their banks, especially the province of Buenos Aires that was controlled by the Peronists. 
When the international capital dried up and the days of cheap credit were over, the provincial 
governments started to issue their own currencies (patacones) and wanted to use the liquidity 
of the provincial banks to cover their deficits. The worst financial deficits came from the 
province of Buenos Aires headed by Edouardo Duhalde, who had turned the Banco de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires (BPBA) into a ticking bomb. In 2000 the bad loans ratio in BPBA 
escalated heavily, because the provincial government emptied the bank of funds (della 
Paolera/Taylor 2003, s. 17f). 
In 1999 Ménem had handed over to his successor the Radical Fernando de la Rúa, who 
inherited the deteriorating fiscal situation in the middle of a recession. The new government 
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was an unstable coalition and its strategy was to focus on increasing growth. An initial 
attempt to boost confidence among investors through fiscal tightening had rather a negative 
effect on growth. In December 2000 the government obtained a credit line from the IMF and 
other institutions, but growth still didn’t improve. In April, de la Rúa brought in Cavallo as 
economy minister. Cavallo imposed a tax on imports, subsidized exports, lowered the reserve 
requirements, and announced that the exchange rate peg would be altered to include both the 
dollar and the euro at equal weights. Cavallo also sacked the central bank director, Pou, who 
by the financial markets were seen as the guarantor of the prevailing rules, and decided to 
remove the limits to the central bank’s possibilities of increasing liquidity in the financial 
system. More and more people feared that the government was about to abandon the fixed 
exchange rate. After April 2001, the growing uncertainty was mirrored in rising interest rates, 
a heavily escalating currency premium, and an increasing share of dollar deposits (de la 
Torre/Yeyati/Schmukler 2002, p. 9f). Between January and November 2001 the premium of 
the 10-year Argentine government bond rose from 20 % to around 35 % (Moreno 2002, p. 2).  
The governments’ financial situation was worse than it seemed. The link to the dollar and the 
overvaluation of the peso concealed the dramatic deterioration. The debt was largely in 
dollars, but revenues were not. Further, the deflationary adjustment that was necessary to 
correct the real exchange rate without changing the nominal rate would inevitably have 
broken the debt service ability of the governments, households and firms. The alternative to 
the fixed currency policy was devaluation that would increase the debt burden enormously 
and probably lead to default and a large-scale financial crisis. A way to avoid such a debt 
crisis would be to rewrite all financial contracts in pesos before the devaluation, but this 
involved the danger of a bank run (Perry/Servén 2003, p. 4, 42).  
In April 2001 the government succeeded in placing bonds worth 2 billion US$ with the banks, 
and allowed the banks to include these bonds in the liquidity requirements. In the summer, the 
similar so called “megaswap” took place. The government thus avoided arrears by using the 
liquidity of the banks. In this way, the exposure of the banks to a government default 
increased and concerns about the convertibility grew. Some view these actions as forced 
transfers of reserves from the banks to the government, comparable to bank robbery (della 
Paolera/Taylor 2003, p. 14ff). 
The parallell currencies of the provinces also undermined the confidence in the convertibility. 
In 2001, the Argentine government approved that the provinces paid the national government 
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with their provincial money at par with the peso. Thereby, the balance sheet of the national 
government and those of the provinces were in practice put together. The provinces were 
allowed to print unlimited amounts of money. The central bank could no longer control the 
money supply (della Paolera/Taylor 2003, p. 20f). 
In the fall, the government negotiated with the IMF and USA on support for a new bond issue 
that would replace the old debts, and also with the provincial governments on an agreement 
on the distribution of tax revenues, which the IMF saw as a precondition for additional 
support. The elections in October resulted in a hung parliament, and the coalition stayed in 
power. In November 2001, the IMF announced that it would not back Argentina as long as the 
budget discipline was inadequate and an agreement on taxes was not in place (de la 
Torre/Yeyati/Schmukler 2002, p. 25). Consequently, the crisis of confidence was total among 
both the public and foreign creditors. Everyone started to flee the peso and credits were 
squeezed. Between July and November, 15 billion USD was withdrawn from the banks and 
several banks were close to collapsing. To save them, Cavallo on December 1st 2001 imposed 
a limit for bank withdrawals of 1 000 US$ per month, the so called ”corralito” (The 
Economist, 2002). Together with other disliked measures, as lower pensions and wages for 
public sector employees, this led to nationwide strikes and demonstrations. The president 
proclaimed a state of emergency, but without a political agreement with the opposition, the 
protests continued and changed into stone throwing and bloody riots before Christmas. Some 
people were killed and hundreds were injured. This turmoil on the streets of the capital should 
probably be seen in the light of the political power struggle between the national government 
and the Peronist Duhalde fraction in the province of Buenos Aires.  
The breakdown came after over three years of growing poverty, sky-high unemployment and 
economic recession. On December 19-20
th
 the entire government left office. Another three 
presidents followed during the remaining days of 2001. One of them, Rodriguez Saa, decided 
to default on the foreign debt and to introduce a new currency, the argentino. On January 1st 
the Peronist Duhalde took charge. He ended the convertibility, closed the currency board, and 
set the peso floating. To save the banks, that were forced to close for almost a week in 
January, this was preceded by an almost complete freeze of bank deposits and by a stock 
pesification, which meant that all domestic financial contracts and bank holdings were 
converted into pesos at a rate of 1,4 peso per dollar. This was necessary to avoid the ruin of 
large numbers of debitors with debts in dollars, but with incomes in pesos, which would have 
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made the banks go bust (de la Torre/Yeyati/Schmukler 2002, p. 11). This made the blow to 
the banks softer than otherwise and was perhaps a way to return the favor of using banks’ 
liquidity earlier in 2001 (della Paolera/Taylor 2003, p. 20f). Duhalde scrapped however the 
plan for the new currency. The effect of these meaures was that almost a million Argentines 
with savings accounts or bank certificates saw their dollar assets dwindle by 60-70 %. In June 
the exchange rate against the dollar had sunk nearly 75 %, and all households and firms that 
had foreign debts in dollars had over night been put in an impossible position by the 
multifolding of their debt in peso. When Argentina defaulted the debt amounted to 155 billion 
USD, which was the biggest ”bankruptcy” in history (The Economist, 2002). 
The effects of the crisis were devastating. Early in 2002 the per capita income in dollars had 
been halved, unemployment had risen to 25 % and poverty ratio in the cities had escalated to 
44 % (The Economist, 2002). GDP fell by 15 % in 2001-02. The inflation increased to over 
40 % at the end of 2002. In October that year the peso was worth 27 cents. In 2003 growth 
returned and inflation fell markedly.  
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4. Comparisons 
Table 2 below is a comparative summary of the four crises that I have outlined above.  
Table 2: A comparative summary of four crises 
 1890-91 1929-32 1980-82 2001-02 
External shocks Interest rate hike 
1889 in UK. 
Falling TOT. 
Interest rate hike 
1928 in USA. 
Stock crash 1929. 
TOT-shock. 
Deflation and 
depression.  
Oil crisis 1979, 
world recession. 
Falling TOT.  
Higher interest rates 
and stronger dollar. 
Devaluation in 
Brazil 1999.  
Stronger dollar.  
Mild recession. 
Capital flows and 
savings 
Large inflows.  
For infrastructure 
and consumption. 
Sinking savings 
before the crisis. 
Sudden stop 1890. 
Modest inflows. 
Rising savings 
before the crisis. 
No sudden stop. 
Large inflows. 
For real estates, 
consumption. 
Sinking savings 
before the crisis. 
Large capital flight. 
Sudden stop 1982. 
Large inflows.  
For public 
consumption. 
Savings in a 
constantly low 
level. 
Sudden stop 2001.  
Financial sector Deregulation 1887. 
Credit expansion. 
Rising competition 
– higher credit risks. 
Speculation. 
Gaucho banking. 
Banking crash in 
1891. 
Stagnating 
development – lack 
of capital. 
Gaucho banking. 
Moral hazard.  
Banks in trouble 
1931, but saved by 
BNA. 
Deregulation 1977. 
Credit expansion. 
Rising competition 
– higher credit risks. 
Speculation. 
Banking crash in 
1980-81. 
Deregulation 1991. 
Credit expansion. 
Gaucho banking.  
Exposure to 
government 
insolvency. 
Bank run in 2001, 
holiday 2002.  
Monetary regime Gold standard 1883-
85. After that very 
expansive monetary 
policy.  
Strong depreciation.  
Gold standard from 
1927 to Dec 1929.  
Real monetary shift 
in April 1931 - 
countered deflation. 
Pre-announced rate 
of depreciation. 
Overvalued 
currency from 1978.  
Ultra-firm fixed rate 
regime from 1991.  
Dollarisation. 
Overvalued 
currency from 1998 
to January 2002. 
Fiscal policy Large deficits. High 
inflation. 
Escalating public 
and foreign debt.  
External default in 
Jan 1891. 
Tight fiscal policy. 
Modest 
indebtedness. 
No external default. 
Large deficits. High 
inflation. 
Escalating public 
and foreign debt. 
External default in 
Aug 1982.  
Large deficits. 
Escalating public 
and foreign debt. 
External default in 
Dec 2001.  
Political factors Weak government.  
Political unrest. 
Rebellion Jul 1890. 
Increasing political 
conflicts. 
Coup d’etat Sep 
1930. 
Military coup, 
terror. Increased 
political tension. 
War Apr 1982. 
Increasing political 
conflicts.  
Weak government. 
Riots and strikes 
Dec 2001. 
Crisis 
management 
No measures until 
the fall 1890 – too 
late.  
Devaluation 1929.  
Shift to expansive 
monetary policy in 
April 1931.  
Great uncertainty 
around economic 
policy. Inability to 
reduce budget 
deficit and inflation. 
Tightening in mid-
recession; rising 
uncertainty 2001 
from political 
measures. 
Main source of 
crisis 
Domestic. External. Domestic and 
external. 
Domestic. 
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4.1. Comparison of causes of crises  
Here, I will compare the four crises starting in the general explanations for crises outlined in 
section 2.2. I will present a number of diagrams, where I compare the development for 
different variables during the four crises. This is done within the same time frame, ranging 
from six years before the start of the crises to three years after the starting year so as to 
capture the duration of every crisis. The starting years are set according to Bordo (2002) for 
the three earlier crises, that is to 1890, 1929 and 1980, and to 2001 for the fourth crisis.  
A crisis is caused by external factors, for example rising interest rates, aggravated 
terms of trade or a world recession. 
External factors contributed to the crises in all four periods. Rising British interest rates from 
1889 and falling terms of trade 1888-1890 affected Argentina’s economy negatively, but there 
was no global recession. The 1930s crisis on the other hand originated from a global 
depression. The export economy was hard hit by declining demand and deflation and terms of 
trade fell sharply after 1929. In 1979, the oil crisis, higher US interest rates and a stronger 
dollar were behind a global recession. Argentine terms of trade fell in 1982. Mexico’s default 
in 1982 affected foreign lending negatively. Russia’s default in 1998 caused a dip in the 
external capital flow and the 1999 devaluation in Brazil undercut Argentine competitiveness. 
A rising dollar and a mild global recession also affected Argentina negatively.  
Diagram 15: Terms of trade during four periods in Argentina 
 
(Bordo 2002 for 1890 (1884=100); Francis 2013, p. 295f, 301 for 1929 (1923=100); Easterly 2001 for 1980 
(1974=100); Ministry of Economy 2006 for 2001 (1995=100)) 
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In 1929-32 the international factors were clearly the main source of the crisis. If the 
international development had not been so powerful around 1930, Argentina would hardly 
have been hit by a crisis of such depth. In a similar way around 1980, external shocks were 
spread from the world economy through rising real interest rates and declines in business 
activities. But, without the domestic disorder in the years around 1980 the crisis would not 
have been as deep. The effect on world GDP and trade was also far more serious in the 1930s 
compared to the 1970s-80s. Also in 2001, there were serious external shocks, but domestic 
policy choices and shortcoming decided the outcome. In the crisis of 1890, the world business 
cycle was of limited significance, so the domestic factors were deciding.  
Strong capital inflows are often not sustainable and a sudden stop in the flow can 
trigger a financial crisis. 
Eichengreen (2003) distinguishes four historic loan booms in the world economy since the 
middle of the 19
th
 century: 1880-1913, the 1920s, 1973-82 and the 1990s. These loan booms 
are linked to upswings in global economic cycles (Eichengreen 2003, p. 14f). The four 
examined crises fall at the end of or some way into these periods of upswing in the 
international capital flows. In three of the four crises, the capital flows were so considerable 
that the resulting debts were not manageable. The inflows of the 1920s were not as extensive 
and the policy that was conducted then resulted in the country meeting its obligations. In 
diagram 16 the current account balance is used as a proxy for capital inflows.  
Diagram 16: Current account balance in % of GDP during four periods in Argentina 
 
(Taylor 1997 for 1890 and 1929; Dornbusch/de Pablo 1987 for 1980; WEO 2014 for 2001.) 
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When the UK business cycle turned in the late 1880s, the British interest rates were raised, 
that led to a sudden stop in the capital inflow to Argentina in 1890-91.  
In spite of the fact that the American lending decreased sharply in 1928, the capital inflow to 
Argentina increased in 1929-30. Argentina had current account deficits until 1935.  
In the 1970s, big budget deficits, deregulation and the great liquidity in the world economy 
produced large capital inflows, which are not visible in the current account balance, since 
there was a build-up of reserves 1976-79. Capital flight was extensive from 1980. When 
private lending fell in 1982 and stopped after Mexico’s default, the IMF took over the 
funding.  
There were large capital inflows during the entire 1990s, but especially in 1996-1998. From 
1999 they declined as a result of the default in Russia and recession, but when the capital 
flows rose again to the rest of Latin America, they continued to fall to Argentina. In the 
second half of 2001 came a sudden stop in the capital flow. 
In three out of four crises, except the 1930s, the capital flows were dominated by bonds or 
bank loans, which probably made the flows more volatile.  
A comparison of the total foreign debt as a ratio of exports shows that the debt burden at the 
end of the 1920s was lighter than in the other crises. On average the ratio was 281 % in the 
years 1887-1890, 136 % in 1929-30, 276 % in 1976-83 and 439 % in 1996-99 (della 
Paolera/Irogoin/Bózzoli 2003, p. 61). The diagram above over external debt service in % of  
Diagram 17: External debt service in % of exports for four periods in Argentina 
 
(Ford 1962, p. 139 for 1890; Balboa 1972, p. 170 for 1929; WDI 2015 for 1980 and 2001.) 
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exports shows the same pattern. In the years of default (1891, 1982 and 2002) there is a big 
fall in debt service.  
Falling savings during a period of strong capital inflows increases the risk for 
financial crisis.  
The development in Argentina in the 1880s and 1970s seems to exemplify how sinking 
savings in a situation with large capital inflows have added to inflation and contributed to a 
financial crisis. Also in the 1990s falling savings was evident during the first half of the 
1990s, after the deregulation, and weakly in the latter half of the decade. In contrast, the 
savings ratio rose at the end of the 1920s. 
The ratio of savings to GDP was acceleratingly negative in 1886-1890. The large foreign 
lending went via the banks and parts of it seem to have financed consumption and 
government expenses. The inflation rate soared. This period of crisis best illustrates Gould’s 
description of the impacts of a lack of savings.  
The savings ratio diminished markedly from 1977. Imports of consumption goods rose and 
the capital inflow was to a large extent used for sustaining public sector consumption in the 
face of growing budget deficits. Hence, the inflation rate was never under control and 
exploded in the 1980s.  
The savings ratio in the 1990s was on a lower level than earlier, and sank steadily from the 
beginning of the 1990s. After 1995 there was however only a tiny fall. The public sector 
Diagram 18: Ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP during four periods in Argentina 
 
(Taylor 1997, p. 36ff for 1890, 1929 and 1980; WDI 2015 for 2001.) 
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deficits increased towards the end of the decade, but the inflation rate was still low until the 
currency policy was abandoned. 
Domestic financial deregulation and privatization leads to a heavy credit expansion 
which causes a financial crisis.  
A common feature in the three crises that saw serious problems related to the capital account 
is that extensive liberalization reforms were carried out before the crises. The development in 
the financial sector after 1887, 1977 and 1991 respectively show similarities in the form of 
deregulations, privatizations, a growing number of banks, competition from foreign banks, 
rising credit volumes in combination with increased risk taking, speculation and lack of 
supervision. The end was in these three periods actual or essential collapse of the banking 
sector. Here is a common cause for the crises in 1890-91 and 1980-82, but in the 1990s it is 
rather the crisis in 1995 that fits into this pattern. Towards the end of the 1990s some of the 
problems that the deregulation created had been sorted out. This supports the explanation of a 
connection between financial deregulation and financial crises. A common element of the 
three crises is a substantial expansion of credits and money supply. In contrast to these three 
periods the credit market in the 1920s only grew slowly. Further, the financial liberalization 
reforms were not managed in the proper way, since the authorities failed to supervise the 
banks sufficiently. Such situations of fast credit expansion tend to strengthen the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. During all four periods the banks also counted on the 
government rescue them in case a crisis struck.  
Diagram 19: Money supply in % of GDP during four periods in Argentina 
 
 (Bordo 2002 for 1890 and 1929 (M1); WDI 2015 for 1980 and 2001 (M2).) 
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The diagram above showing the money supply indicates that extensive credit expansion took 
place in particular before 1890 and 2001, but also in the 1970s. It is also clear that there was 
no expansion of the ratio of money supply to GDP in the 1920s, which fits with the picture of 
a weak financial development.  
A main theme going through the crises of Argentina is, according to della Paolera/Taylor 
(2003), “gaucho banking”, i e the interaction between a weak, undisciplined or corrupt 
banking sector and some other group of benefiters from the public or the private sector, which 
precipitates a collapse.”Gaucho banking” means unsound, extravagant credit creation and 
credit policy, often leading to speculation and fraud, and it has been a cause of the financial 
crises that has repeatedly struck the country (della Paolera/Taylor 2003, p. 2). In particular, 
there are similarities between the Baring crisis and the crisis in 2001 regarding this. The years 
before the crisis of the 1930s, there were no credit expansion comparable to the other three 
periods. But, della Paolera/Taylor (2003) assert that the financial system in the late 1920s was 
not sound, since the system of ”gaucho banking” was widespread and even encouraged by the 
political power.  
An appreciating real exchange rate (for example from high inflation or exaggerated 
capital inflows) leads to an overvalued currency, which causes a financial crisis.  
In all four crises the real exchange rate appreciated and it was necessary with some sort of 
adjustment of the nominal exchange rate to correct the problems.  
Diagram 20: Real exchange rates, indexed for four periods in Argentina 
 
(Calculated from Flandreau/Zumer 2004 for 1890, UK£ (1884=100); calculated from Bordo 2002 (prices) and 
Diaz Alejandra 1983, p 13 (nom exchange rate) for 1929, US$ (1923=100); Dornbusch/de Pablo 1987, p 22 for 
1980 (1974=100); BIS 2015 for 2001 (real effective exch rate; Mar 1995=100 )) 
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The peso floated from 1885 and depreciated strongly 1889-1891 as a result of expansive 
monetary policy and lax fiscal policy resulting in high inflation. As the nominal exchange rate 
adapted continually, the currency didn’t become overvalued.  
In the 1920s there was some real appreciation until late 1929. The changes in currency policy 
in 1929 and above all in 1931 resulted in a large correction.  
The crawling peg from December 1978 was set up to bring inflation down. The inflation rate 
was however higher than the preannounced depreciation rate, so the currency became vastly 
overvalued. The real exchange rate rose dramatically to 1980. This produced large capital 
inflows and rising imports. Early in 1981 a currency crisis burst and the crawling peg was 
given up.  
The convertibility plan of 1991 locked the peso to the dollar in a rigid exchange rate regime. 
During the 1990s the real exchange rate appreciated, which became a problem in the late 
1990s. The currency got increasingly overvalued and in 2000-2001 the confidence in the fixed 
exchange rate was undermined as the public debt swelled. The breakdown came in January 
2002, when the government closed the currency board and the peso was set afloat.  
The dollar convertibility and the currency board of the 1990s was a direct parallel to the gold 
standard in the 1920s, both a fixed exchange rate-regime, and with the policies founded in 
very unpleasant experiences of grave inflation problems. A difference between the 1920s and 
1990s is that the policy makers in the latter period were prepared to go much further to defend 
the exchange rate than the decision makers of the 1920s. At the end of the 1970s a crawling 
peg was practised, but like in the late 1920s and 1990s the currency became overvalued. The 
late 1880s differed from the other three crises in that the exchange rate floated, but the 
nominal depreciation was a way of continually accomodating to real appreciation. 
The two crises of 1890 and 1930 both occurred during the period from 1867 to 1930, when 
Argentina tried to stick to the gold standard, but recurrently was struck by monetary 
instability (1876-83, 1885-1899, 1914-27) (Bordo/Végh 1998, p. 12). With Argentina’s great 
international dependence it was necessary to at least have the ambition to stick to this 
framework. One difference between the two crises is that the economic policy in the late 
1880s made a return to the gold standard impossible for a long time, while the government in 
the 1920s tried to keep with the gold standard rules, even though the formal link to the gold 
was cut early on.  
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The exchange rate played a central role in three of the four crises. The exception was the 
1880s, when the government had given up on the gold standard and pursued a far too 
expansive economic policy. In contrast to that some economists have concluded that the 
government in the 1990s was too rigid in its defence of the fixed exchange rate and that it was 
this that dragged down the economy in 2001-02. In the 1920s the government had a more 
pragmatic view to the currency policy, without disregarding the demands of the gold standard. 
Both in 1929 and 1931 it was prepared to change its policies. This can be seen as a more 
intelligent economic policy, but it can also be interpreted as following the will of the 
dominating exporting groups, the same interests that asserted their influence in the 1880s. 
Also in the 1980s the exchange rate policy was central, now as in the 1990s an anchor in the 
fight against inflation. The shortcomings of the 1980s were that the policy was not combined 
with tight fiscal policy and currency regulations.  
Large budget deficits and growing public debts lead to higher inflation rate, which 
ends in a financial crisis.  
The diagram below shows how the government budget deficits during the years before the 
crises were permanent in all four periods. The deficits in relation to GDP were largest in the 
1970s, but one must remember that the public budgets in the 1800s were a lot smaller 
compared to later. The deficits in the 1920s were overall more limited.  
The fiscal policy and the debt burden are most important as a crisis explanation concerning 
the 1890 crisis. Inflation rate rose quickly in 1889-1891 and public debt almost tripled its  
Diagram 21: Government surplus as % of GDP for four periods 
 
 (Bordo 2002 för 1890 and 1929; Dornbusch/de Pablo 1987 for 1980; ECLAC Cepalstat 2014 for 1990s.) 
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share of GDP from 1885 to 1891 (90,6 %). The debt payments became an increasingly heavy 
burden, which led to default in January 1891. The extremely lax fiscal policy the years before 
the Baring crisis was a main cause of this crisis. Around 1980 a similar situation with large 
deficits, a growing public debt and quickly rising inflation (averaged almost 180 % 1978-
1983) developed resulting from the weak fiscal policy. From 5-7 % of GDP at the end of the 
1970s, deficits rose to around 18 % in 1981-83. Extensive capital flight added to the part of 
the public external debt which grew five times 1977-1983. Deficits were permanent all 
through the 1990s, and increased around 2000, primarily explained by the prolonged 
recession and rising interest rates. An important difference in comparison with 1890 and 1980 
was that high inflation was not a problem around 2000. In contrast to these three crises stand 
the tight fiscal policy during the crisis of the 1930s, that gave rise to only modest deficits. The 
debt burden grew, but this is explained rather by aggravated terms of trade rather than large 
budget deficits (Gould 1972, p. 196). 
Political shocks can set off a crisis or contribute to aggravating it.   
A common feature of all four crises is that the years before each crisis were characterized by 
intensified political tensions, power struggles and by the weakening of the governments. In all 
cases the governments’ ability to take strong measures to stabilize the economy waned. With 
the exception of the crisis in the 1930s, this decline in government power contributed to the 
loss of control over the public finances.  
Another similarity is that serious political shocks occurred at the same time as the economic 
crises – an uprising in July 1890, a coup in September 1930, a war in the spring-summer of 
1982 and violent strikes and riots in December of 2001. In the last two cases the political 
crisis coincided with the climax of the economic crises. These dramatic events gave rise to 
great uncertainty around the economic situation, not least among foreign investors. The coup 
in 1930 seems to have had a relatively minor economic importance, maybe as a consequence 
of the fact that the depression already had spread and was about to deepen all over the world. 
Obviously, we also have to realise that the economic crisis in each of the four cases 
contributed to causing political unrest. Economic and political conditions interacted.  
Was growing poverty and income gaps a factor that could explain the political tensions in line 
with Sachs (1989b)? I have only found data on income distributions on the two more recent 
crises. The Gini coefficient for Argentina in 1974 was 0,367 and rose to 0,394 in 1980. Over 
the decade 1990-2000 it grew from 0,459 to 0,510. In 1974 the average wage in the first 
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quintile of households was 6,77 times the average wage in the fifth quintile. In 1980 the 
difference had grown to 8,04. In 1990 it was 11,74, in 1994 12,6 and in the year 2000 17,09 
(Altimir et al 2002, p. 64, 70). In particular the end of the 1990s was a period of heavily 
expanding income differences, rising unemployment and falling real incomes, which probably 
contributed to the political and economic collapse in 2001-02. The rise in income differences 
at the end of the 1970s was more modest, but real incomes fell for several years and from 
1979 there was resistance from unions. Also in the late 1880s, real wages fell, which led to 
labour unrest in 1889 and riots in 1890.  
Mismanagement can turn the economic imbalances into a financial crisis.   
The actions taken during the crisis of the 1930s anew differ from those of the other three 
periods in the relatively successful crisis management that the decision-makers then 
accomplished. The decision in 1929 to leave the gold standard and the change in monetary 
policy in April 1931 produced a turn-around, which broke the deflation spiral of the economy. 
One does not find any similar positive economic policy intervention during the other periods 
of crisis, which all three ended in crashes. The actions of the governments were instead 
characterized by passivity, unstableness or mistakes.  
In the late 1880s, the Argentine government under Celman used its reserves and new loans 
until the fall of 1890 to avoid any painful decisions that could have dealt with the imbalances 
that had been built up. Around 1980, the government was unable to reduce budget deficits, to 
stop capital flight and to halt inflation. Its actions increased uncertainty concerning its 
economic policy, which was strengthened by the succession of military leaders, by political 
turmoil and by war. In 2000, the government’s austerity policy aggravated the recession and 
the change in economic policy in April 2001 added uncertainty around the exchange rate. 
Further, the central bank lost control over the money supply by the decision to equate the 
provincial currencies with the peso. In November 2001, the IMF withdrew its support after 
disapproving the fiscal policy.  
4.2. Discussion of causes 
Some economists (for example Rock 1986, p. 60) have put most of the blame for the crisis in 
1890-91 on the extensive capital flows from abroad. The sudden stop in the capital inflow was 
surely important, but this explanation seems somewhat narrow. The crucial factor was rather 
how the economy handled these capital flows. As Eichengreen has pointed out, the foreign 
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capital not only flowed into investments in productive capacity, but also raised consumption, 
was used for government expenses and fed speculation. The government failed to raise its 
savings to counteract the lack of savings in the private sector (Eichengreen 2003, p. 187f). 
The reversal in the international interest level in 1889 and the ensuing fall in capital inflows 
were certainly important and the recession also hit other developing economies, but growth in 
the centre of the world economy was good. The explanation of the crisis lies not in a global 
recession. Rather, the main causes were domestic. The expansive fiscal policy meant 
substantial government deficits, which resulted in high inflation and mounting debts. The 
government did not manage to control the increase in the money supply. Financial 
deregulation resulted in an exaggerated credit expansion. The financial system lacked 
supervision and central bank, the issue of banknotes was unorganized and many banks 
provided cheap loans to extravagant provincial governments. The failed attempt to join the 
gold standard in 1885 and the continuous depreciation of the peso undermined confidence in 
the economy. This economic policy was largely the result of the political dominance of the 
landowners and exporting firms. The value of the export was upheld throughout the crisis, 
while the adjustment struck imports, investments and production. Political unrest and weak 
management of the crisis created further uncertainty among foreign investors.  
The crisis of the 1930s originated in the world economy. Exports was hit hard by the 
decreasing demand from the industrialized countries, worsening terms of trade and the 
deflation that spread from 1929. There don’t seem to be much argument in the literature over 
this picture of an external shock that caused the economic downturn. In the financial sector 
not enough capital was mobilized and the allocation of it was inefficient. The domestic credit 
market developed only slowly and the position of the private banks weakened during this 
period. However, these deficiencies didn’t cause the crisis, but rather meant that the 
international crisis affected Argentina deeper than without these shortcomings. della Paolera 
and Taylor (1998) argue that Argentina avoided a major disaster in the 1930s by breaking 
with the orthodox economic mentality, the adherence to the gold standard. The fiscal scope 
for action was small, partly because the big foreign debt that had to be serviced in order to 
keep favourable trade terms with Great Britain. But, a bold change in the monetary policy 
eliminated the deflationary expectations and started the recovery (della Paolera and Taylor 
1998, p. 32). 
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Concerning causes of the crisis 1980-82 there has been a vast debate about whether the 
external or domestic factors were most important. Some economists argue that the strong 
capital inflow led to a strong real exchange rate appreciation, which destabilized the economy 
and hurt the international competitiveness (Edwards 1998, p. 19, 56; Fanelli/Machinea 1994, 
p. 49). Larússon et al emphasize the aggressive lending of the international banks together 
with the liberalization of the finance sector as causes for the credit expansion. Then, when the 
interest rates rose in USA and the dollar strengthened, the export revenues fell and the debt 
trap closed on Argentina (Larússon et al 1985, p. 61). In addition to this, de Vylder 
emphasizes rising oil prices, falling primary goods prices, and the world recession that led to 
stagnating trade and protectionism (de Vylder 1991, p. 29f). Other economists focus on 
domestic factors. They assert that the most serious mistake was the overvaluation of the 
currency in 1978-1982 (Maddison 1985, p. 55, Dornbusch/de Pablo 1987, p. 12, Berlinski 
2003, p. 215). The economic policy resulted in a heavy real exchange rate appreciation. Other 
shortcomings were the political turbulence, the Falklands war and the large government 
deficits which made it impossible to take control over inflation. All this created uncertainty 
and triggered capital flight, which was made easier by the liberalized finance sector. The 
economic policy thus generated grave imbalances, without which the crisis would have been 
less severe. Sachs et al (1996) also point to the domestic financial deregulation and 
privatization as the source of the quick credit expansion and ultimately the financial crash 
(Sachs/Tornell/Velasco 1996, p. 26). External factors obviously played an important part in 
the Argentine crisis. It seems however, that without the internal factors – the flawed currency 
policy, the lax fiscal policy, the political turmoil and mismanagement, and the domestic 
financial liberalization – the crisis of the early 1980s would not have set the Argentine 
economy on such a devastating path as it did. 
In the lengthy debate about the explanations for the crisis in 2001, some economists blame the 
rigid monetary regime. In this view, the convertibility to the dollar was the wrong policy 
choice and hindered accommodation to the external shocks in the late 1990s. Devaluation was 
ruled out, but had become necessary to lower the costs. Other economists mean that the 
monetary regime was undermined by the lax fiscal policy. Increasing deficits and a mounting 
public debt had made the economy more vulnerable when the recession hit in 1998 (Moreno 
2002; della Paolera/Taylor 2003). A third view has pointed to the shift in the world economy 
after the crisis in Russia in 1998 and emphasizes that decreasing international capital flows 
led to lower investments and a deepened recession. In any case, there seems to be agreement 
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on the overvaluation of the peso. To Bleaney this was caused mainly by the sudden stop in the 
capital flow, which resulted in higher interest rates, a mounting debt burden and lower 
investments. This affected the sustainability of the convertibility negatively (Bleaney 2004, p. 
710ff). Perry/Servén (2003) on the other hand point out that the serious decline in the capital 
flow didn’t appear until after 1999 and by then the international capital had returned to other 
developing economies. Perry/Servén (2003) assert that Argentina was not hit harder than 
other economies in the region by the external shocks. Instead, there were specific Argentine 
factors at work. The years of high growth was a lost opportunity. Then, a strengthened fiscal 
policy, a more flexible labour market, unilateral liberalization of foreign trade and stricter 
supervision of the banks could have laid the foundation for keeping the fixed exchange rate 
and better handling external shocks. But, none of this was done (Perry/Servén 2003, p. 5). The 
latter analysis is convincing. The monetary regime became a problem because the authorities 
neglected the economic policy. It is, however, reasonable to ask if these tough measures were 
actually politically feasible, given the social tensions that rising unemployment and poverty 
had created. Moreover, the need for such a policy seemed weak before 1999 in the light of the 
good growth and the big capital inflow (de la Torre et al 2002, p. 1, Eichengreen 2008, p. 
210).  
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5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this essay has been to try to find causes to the crises and to compare the crises 
in search of similarities, differences and possible patterns.  One result is that external factors, 
although influential in every crisis, were dominant in only one of the four cases examined, the 
one in 1929-32. Falling world demand, deteriorating terms of trade and deflation dealt a 
severe blow to exports. By accommodating the monetary policy, Argentina managed to avoid 
default and a major bank crash. This outcome is the best of the four crises, although the 
contraction was most prolonged.  
Weaknesses in the financial sector, an appreciating real exchange rate and political turbulence 
were characteristics in common of all four crises. First, in all four periods the banks colluded 
with private or public interests, which by weakening the financial sector contributed to the 
crises. Except the 1920s, there were badly managed deregulation reforms some years ahead of 
three crises, which resulted in higher risk, speculation and large credit expansions. In the end, 
the banking sector crashed in 1891, 1982 and 2002, but not in 1932. So, there is support for 
the explanation that deregulation of the financial sector can contribute to financial crisis. 
Second, the real exchange rate appreciated before all four crises, although it was only in the 
two latter ones that overvaluation became a big problem. In 1890 the floating currency 
depreciated and in 1929 Argentina left the gold standard, but in 1980 the crawling peg was 
used to bring down inflation and in 2001 the dollar link was the centrepiece of reforms. In the 
two latter crises the exchange rate regime was thus more rigid and definitely has a role in 
explaining events. Third, all crises were preceded by increased political tensions, which led to 
a diminished confidence in the economic policy and to weaker governments. Save for 1929, 
this decline in government power contributed to the loss of control over public finances. Thus, 
there is support for the explanation that political shocks can aggravate a financial crisis. 
In three out of four crises, again except 1929, there were sudden stops in the external capital 
flows. These had been so massive that debts mounted to unmanageable levels. The endings of 
exaggerated capital inflows became a problem, but as they occurred rather late in each crisis 
and were not only exogenous, they should be viewed as precipitating events, rather than 
primary causes. Falling savings ratios was also an explanatory factor in two crises – 1890 and 
1980. The combination with large foreign borrowing via banks and government deficits led to 
high inflation. In the 1880s, 1970s and 1990s the public deficits were relatively large, 
stimulated the foreign inflow of funds and eventually led to default, which supports the 
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explanation that a weak fiscal policy can lead to a crisis. Only in the crisis 1929-32, there was 
clearly a successful management of the situation. In the other three, bad management may 
have aggravated the outcomes. 
I did not expect to be able to single out the most important explanatory factor of every crisis, 
but to do that would surely be feasible. In a more narrow setting using econometric methods it 
could be possible to reach more certain and definitive results concerning the crucial factor of 
each crisis.  
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Appendix 
Notes on the data in the tables below 
1. Concerning the real exchange rate, there is use of two differing definitions, depending on how the nominal 
exchange rate is expressed. I have used the definition given in Mankiw (1992, p. 192), where the real exchange 
rate equals the nominal exchange rate in foreign currency per peso times the ratio of domestic to foreign prices 
levels. To avoid causing the reader the same confusion this has caused me, this is mentioned here.  
2. The real exchange rates for the two earlier periods, I have calculated using for 1884-1893 data from 
Flandreau/Zumer (2004) on the nominal peso exchange rate in French francs, the franc exchange rate in UK£ 
and price indexes of Argentina and UK, and for 1923-1932 price indexes from Bordo (2002) and the nominal 
exchange rate from Díaz Alejandro (1983).  
3. The terms of trade-index for 1923-1932 has been calculated using indexes from Francis (2013) over import 
prices and export prices.  
4. Concerning the indicator government surplus in % of GDP, I have not been able to find any definition for the 
data from Bordo (2002) for 1884-1893 and 1923-1932. It is likely that it refers to central government. The same 
goes for Dornbusch/de Pablo (1987) for 1974-1983.  
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Table 3: Economic indicators, 1884-1893 
 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 
1. GDP (constant., mill pesos) 355 376 376 422 463 543 520 462 503 528 
2. Current account balance 
(curr., mill pesos) 
-54 -42 -73 -95 -115 -242 -262 16 -3 -95 
3. Current account (% of 
GDP) 
-15,1 -9,1 -15,3 -18,5 -20,4 -30,4 -24,5 1,1 -0,3 -7,5 
4. Savings (% of GDP)  2,5 -6,1 -10,0 -9,0 -18,7 -8,1 13,3 7,1 -0,3 
5. Investments (% of GDP)  11,6 9,2 8,5 11,4 11,7 16,5 12,2 7,4 7,1 
6. Money supply (M1), annual 
change (%) 
 25,7 21,5 5,2 34,5 33 11,7 -22,8 -7,3 7,3 
7. Government surplus, % of 
GDP 
-4,9 -4,1 -2,4 -2,5 -4,2 -4,2 -2,0 -3,5 -1,4 0,1 
8. GDP per capita, constant 
1989 dollars 
675 693 671 728 775 879 816 703 742 755 
9. Terms of trade-index 
(1886=100) 
101,1 90,4 100 97,3 82,1 76,8 70,4 84,3 77,0 71,6 
10. Inflation, % annual 
change of GDP-deflator 
 22,4 2,2 -3,4 -0,4 20,7 40,1 56,4 -20,1 -6,2 
11. Public debt, nominal (mill 
pesos) 
125 157 163 192 411 527 932 1 386 1 401 1 390 
12. Public debt, % of GDP 33,8 32,6 33,2 36,2 70,8 64,3 84,7 90,6 105,3 106,1 
13. Short-term rates, Bank of 
England (%) 
2,93 2,99 3,02 3,33 3,30 3,58 4,52 3,28 2,51 3,05 
14. Exports (mill gold pesos) 68 84 70 84 100 123 101 103 113 94 
15. Imports (mill gold pesos) 94 92 95 117 128 165 142 67 91 96 
16. Foreign borrowing (mill 
gold pesos) 
40 39 68 154 248 154 45 8 n.a. n.a. 
17. External debt service in % 
of exports 
41 27 39 44 50 49 59 31 n.a. n.a. 
18. Paper note circulation 
(mill paper pesos) 
62 75 89 94 130 164 245 261 282 307 
19. Gold premium (1884 = 
par) 
100 137 139 135 148 191 251 387 332 324 
20. Nominal exchange rate, 
pound per paper peso 
0,19 0,14 0,14 0,15 0,13 0,11 0,08 0,05 0,06 0,06 
21. Real exchange rate 
(1884=100) 
100 93 106 107 96 93 90 96 91 88 
Sources: 1-5: Taylor 1997, p. 36; 6-10: Bordo 2002; 11-13, 20-21 (calculated): Flandreau & Zumer 2004; 14-19: Ford 1962, 
p. 139 
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Table 4: Economic indicators, 1923-1932 
 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
1, GDP (constant, bill pesos) 25,92 27,94 27,82 29,16 31,23 33,17 34,70 33,26 30,96 29,93 
2. GDP (curr., mill pesos) 7 724 8 951 9 035 8 536 8 958 9 611 9 749 8 956 8 063 7 883 
3 Current account balance 
(curr., mill pesos) 
-394 -312 -312 -268 51 -113 -379 -851 -260 -57 
4. Current account (% of 
GDP) 
-5,1 -3,5 -3,4 -3,1 0,6 -1,2 -3,9 -9,5 -3,2 -0,7 
5. Savings (% of GDP) 8,4 8,3 8,1 8,7 13,1 12,4 11,4 4,5 6,3 6,4 
6. Investments (% of GDP) 13,5 11,7 11,5 11,8 12,5 13,5 15,3 14,0 9,6 7,1 
7. Money supply (M1), 
annual change (%) 
20,7 3,4 -3,3 8,6 6,8 7,4 -6,4 -1,5 -14,9 3,5 
8. Government surplus, % of 
GDP 
-1,1 -0,8 -0,6 -1,2 -3,9 -1,7 -2,3 -4,4 -2,9 -1,6 
9. GDP per capita, constant 
1989 dollars 
1 065 1 108 1 071 1 092 1 136 1 173 1 194 1 115 1 014 962 
10. Terms of trade-index 
(1886=100) 
75 78 95 82 83 97 96 78 64 56 
11. Inflation, % annual 
change of GDP-deflator 
2,9 2,0 -1,1 -6,0 -1,7 3,5 -2,2 -3,9 -14,1 -7,5 
12. Public debt, % of GDP  24,1 21,2 21,5 21,8 16,1 15,4 19,3 21,8 29,5 
13. Fed discount rate, Bank of 
NY (end of year, %) 
4,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 3,5 5,0 4,5 2,4 3,5 2,5 
14. Exports (curr., mill pesos) 2 011 2 100 2 100 1 824 2 324 2 428 2 196 1 414 1 475 1 305 
15. Imports (curr., mill pesos) 1 929 1 932 1 932 1 569 1 668 1 902 1 959 1 680 1 174 836 
16. Nominal exchange rate 
(US$/peso) 
0,34 0,34 0,40 0,41 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,37 0,29 0,26 
17. Real exchange rate 100 101 115 108 113 118 114 98 73 67 
18. External debt service in % 
of exports 
18 18 18 23 19 19 22 33 33 35 
Sources: 1: Mitchell 1993 p. 818; 2-6, 14-15: Taylor 1997 p. 36ff; 7-9, 11: Bordo 2002; 12: Abbas et al, IMF 2010; 13: 
NBER 2015; 10: Francis 2013 p. 295f, 301; 16-17: Bordo 2002 and Díaz Alejandro 1983 p. 13; 18: Balboa 1972, p. 170 
(average for 1923-1925) 
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Table 5: Economic indicators, 1974-1983 
 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1. GDP (constant, bill pesos) 344,6 344,5 337,5 360,9 344,7 379,9 395,7 373,2 354,7 368,4 
2. Current account balance, 
curr., mill US$ 
127 -1 284 665 1 290 1 833 -537 -4 767 -4 714 -2 357 -2 461 
3. Current account (% of 
GDP) 
0,4 -3,5 1,7 3,0 4,0 -1,0 -7,6 -7,4 -3,8 -3,8 
4. Savings (% of GDP) 23,7 28,7 33,0 33,7 30,6 25,8 23,0 19,9 19,0 18,5 
5. Investments (% of GDP) 23,6 31,2 32,0 32,1 28,4 26,2 25,3 22,7 21,8 20,9 
6. Money supply (M2), annual 
change (%) 
54,5 152,9 353,5 227,2 172,6 187,4 91.8 100,5 139,1 401,2 
7. Government surplus, % of 
GDP 
-8,5 -15,6 -10,6 -5,0 -6,7 -6,7 -8,6 -18,0 -18,9 -17,8 
8. GDP per capita, constant 
2005 dollars 
5 119 5 034 4 855 5 114 4 811 5 225 5 361 4 979 4 661 4 768 
9. Terms of trade-index 
(1995=100) 
101,0 100,6 96,1 87,7 87,6 95,5 111,9 117,4 96,3 98,2 
10. Inflation, % annual 
change of GDP-deflator 
30,6 197,7 438,3 159,4 161,4 147,4 90,8 106,4 207,6 382,4 
11. External debt service in % 
of exports 
33 53 35 34 67 51 109 99 64 72 
12. Public debt (% of GDP) 13,8 18,4 13,8 15,8 16,7 13,5 12,6 21,3 36,0 46,7 
13. Exports (bill constant 
pesos) 
20,0 18,1 23,9 30,4 33,1 32,0 30,4 32,0 33,2 34,1 
14. Imports (bill constant 
pesos) 
18,1 18,4 14,6 20,0 18,9 29,2 42,8 39,3 22,6 21,0 
15. External debt, tot (bill 
current US$) 
7,8 7,9 9,5 11,7 13,5 21,2 27,3 35,8 43,8 46,1 
16. Public external debt, tot 
(bill current US$) 
3,4 3,3 4,7 5,3 7,0 8,8 10,3 10,7 16,0 25,6 
17. External debt, tot (% of 
GDP) 
10,7 14,9 18,6 20,7 23,4 30,9 35,8 46,8 55,3 47,0 
18. Real exchange rate 
(1980=100) 
71,2 36,9 46,4 50,7 64,7 83,4 100,0 69,5 48,9 58,8 
19. US real lending interest 
rates (%) 
1,7 -1,3 1,3 0,6 1,9 4,1 5,7 8,7 8,3 6,6 
Sources: 1, 6, 8, 10-11, 13-17, 19: World Development Indicators, World Bank 2015, 2-3, 7, 18: Dornbusch/de Pablo 1987, 
p. 22ff, 4-5: Taylor 1997, p. 36; 9: Easterly 2001; 12: Abbas et al, IMF 2010 
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Table 6: Main economic indicators, 1995-2004 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1. GDP (constant., 1993 bill 
pesos) 
243,2 256,6 277,4 288,1 278,4 276,2 264,0 235,2 256,0 279,1 
2. Current account balance, 
curr., bill US$ 
-5,1 -6,8 -12,1 -14,5 -11,9 -9,0 -3,8 8,8 8,1 2,7 
3. Current account (% of 
GDP) 
-1,7 -2,1 -3,5 -4,0 -3,5 -2,6 -1,2 7,5 5,3 1,5 
4. Savings (% of GDP) 17,5 17,4 17,2 17,4 16,3 15,5 15,5 27,0 26,4 24,3 
5. Investments (% of GDP) 18,5 19,6 20,8 20,9 18,3 17,6 14,2    
6. Money supply (M2), annual 
change (%) 
-2,8 18,8 25,5 10,5 4,1 1,5 -19,4 19,7 29,6 21,4 
7. Government surplus, % of 
GDP 
-2,9 -3,2 -1,5 -2,4 -4,5 -3,3 -7,0 -0,8 1,6 3,5 
8. GDP per capita, constant 
2005 dollars 
5 105 5 322 5 685 5 835 5 575 5 473 5 179 4 572 4 931 5 329 
9. Terms of trade-index 
(1993=100) 
101,8 109,8 108,4 102,5 96,4 106,1 105,3 105,0 114,6 116,3 
10. Inflation, % annual 
change of GDP-deflator 
3,2 -0,1 -0,5 -1,7 -1,8 -1,0 -1,1 30,6 10,5 10,6 
11. Public debt, nominal (bill 
pesos) 
88,7 99,0 103,7 114,1 123,4 129,8 144,2 514 523,8 568,1 
12. Public debt, % of GDP 28,8 30,4 29,6 31,9 36,4 38,2 44,9 137,5 116,5 106,0 
13. Exports (bill constant 
pesos) 
70,1 75,4 84,6 93,6 92,4 94,9 97,5 100,5 106,6 115,2 
14. Imports (bill constant 
pesos) 
69,9 82,1 104,2 113,0 100,2 100,1 86,1 43,0 59,2 82,9 
15. External debt, tot (bill 
current US$) 
98,8 111,4 126,8 140,1 150,0 147,0 149,7 145,6 161,1 165,7 
16. External debt, tot (% of 
GDP) 
32,1 34,4 36,4 39,5 44,6 43,7 47,1 125,3 108,1 95,0 
17. External debt service in % 
of exports 
35,6 45,7 52,2 62,0 90,6 79,3 57,7 18,4 42,7 32,7 
18. Unemployment (% of 
total labor force) 
18,8 17,2 14,9 12,8 14,1 15,0 18,3 17,9 16,1 12,6 
19. Real effective exchange 
rate (March 2001 = 100) 
85,0 83,4 86,1 89,6 98,3 97,6 102,3 43,9 46,9 45,1 
20. Lending interest rates (%) 17,8 10,5 9,2 10,6 11,0 11,1 27,7 51,7 19,1 6,8 
Sources: 3, 11-12: World Economic Indicators, IMF 2014; 1-2, 9: Ministry of Economy 2006; 4, 6, 8, 10, 13-18, 20: World 
Development Indicators, World Bank 2015; 7: ECLAC, Cepalstat 2014 (nonfinancial public sector); 5: Bleaney, 2004, p.702; 
19: BIS 2015 
 
